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QUARTERLY REPORT ON THE SPANISH ECONOMY 
1 OVERVIEW
Activity in the world economy suffered a certain loss of momentum in the latest period, 
while the heterogeneity across geographical areas increased. Among the advanced 
economies, the United States was more buoyant than other regions, while among the 
emerging economies, the relative strength of the Asian economies contrasts with the 
weakness of activity in Latin America and in central and eastern Europe. Also, the latest 
indicators point to a sharp slowdown in world trade in recent months.
There were significant developments on international financial markets during the summer 
months. In particular, the currencies of the emerging economies depreciated significantly, 
with particularly sharp falls in the Turkish lira and the Argentine peso, currencies that were 
especially vulnerable because of their countries’ high levels of dollar-denominated foreign 
debt. In addition, there were falls – in some cases very sizeable – on the equity and debt 
markets of emerging countries, in contrast to the stability of US debt yields and the 
strength of the US stock market.
The developments in global activity and financial markets described above seem to reflect a 
partial materialisation of certain risks to the outlook for world activity that have been present 
for a number of quarters. First, it is possible that, through an increase in uncertainty, the 
protectionist threats have begun to affect trade and, perhaps, agents’ spending decisions. 
Second, and probably more importantly, the economic policy mix in the United States, 
characterised by the process of normalisation of monetary policy and a pro-cyclical fiscal 
expansion, may have begun to have negative consequences, through the upward pressure it 
puts on US interest rates and on the dollar and the reduction in global liquidity it entails, both 
for flows of financing to other economic areas and for the cost of such financing. Looking 
ahead, the expansion of the world economy is expected to continue, against a background in 
which monetary policies remain accommodative, although recent developments have led to 
some downward revision of the prospects for world trade and activity.
The divergence in economic developments in the various geographical areas has extended 
to prices, with an increase in core inflation in the United States, but not in the other 
advanced economies, and very pronounced rises in emerging economies that have 
experienced sharp exchange rate depreciation.
In the euro area, the reduced buoyancy of activity seen in the first quarter was again seen 
in the second. Weakening world trade, together with the impact of the past exchange rate 
appreciation, reduced the contribution of net external demand to GDP growth, to negative 
levels in the first half of the year. It is projected that, in the medium term, the persistence 
of favourable financial conditions and the improvement in the financial situation will 
continue to be conducive to the expansion of domestic demand, although it cannot be 
ruled out that this will eventually be affected by the increase in uncertainty linked to 
developments in the rest of the world.
As regards consumer prices, the impact of past increases in the oil price on the year-on-
year rate of inflation will tend to disappear over the coming months. On the other hand, 
core inflation is expected to rise, with a widening positive output gap continuing to translate 
gradually into increases in wage growth, as has already begun to occur in recent quarters. 
The latest projections of the European Central Bank (ECB) envisage a slight deceleration 
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in euro area GDP growth, from 2% in 2018 to 1.7% in 2020, a downward revision of 0.2 
percentage points (pp) in cumulative terms with respect to the Eurosystem’s June 
projections. Meanwhile, the average annual inflation rate is expected to rise to 1.7% in the 
three-year period 2018-2020
Albeit less sharply than in the euro area as a whole, the growth rate of the Spanish economy 
has also slipped recently. On preliminary estimates, GDP grew at a quarter-on-quarter rate 
of 0.6% in Q2, down 0.1 pp from Q1. This mild slowdown is attributable to the loss of 
momentum of private consumption and the weakness of foreign trade. The latest 
information suggests that the growth rate in Q3 may have held steady at 0.6%.
In the medium term, according to the update of the Banco de España’s macroeconomic 
projections presented in Box 1 of this report, the current economic upturn will continue 
over the period 2018-2020. This favourable outlook is based on the progress made in 
correcting the macro-financial imbalances, with the improvement in external 
competitiveness having been fundamental, insofar as it has enabled sustained GDP 
growth to be compatible with a persistently positive external balance. That said, the growth 
rate of GDP is expected to continue to moderate gradually over time, as the stance of 
demand policies becomes less expansionary. Specifically, having grown at a rate of 2.6% 
in 2018, the economy is expected to grow by 2.2% in 2019 and by 2% in 2020. 
These projections involve a certain downward revision of those presented in June, as a 
consequence of the impact on exports of the deterioration in the external environment, 
which will eventually also have adverse effects on household and corporate spending. 
Moreover, the balance of risks to the central scenario of the projections is on the downside. 
On the external front, an intensification of the tightening of global financial conditions, 
leading to new episodes of instability on the most vulnerable emerging markets and a 
consequent adverse impact on global activity, cannot be ruled out. Among the other risks 
arising from the external environment, the threat of further protectionist measures is also 
notable. On the domestic front, as in previous quarters, there is a notable degree of 
uncertainty regarding the future economic policy stance, against a background of 
considerable parliamentary fragmentation. Also, a hypothetical increase in uncertainty, 
associated with the political situation in Catalonia, continues to represent an additional 
risk to economic stability especially in that region.










2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018









2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
2  HARMONISED INDICES OF CONSUMER PRICES
%
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With regard to inflation, the indicator of overall consumer prices has shown rates of growth 
of around 2% in recent months. However, according to measures of core inflation (like the 
one that excludes energy and food), price growth is considerably lower, standing at around 
1%, against a background of deceleration in the services component. As in the euro area 
as a whole, the decline in cyclical slack over the projection period is expected to result in 
a gradual rise in the indicator of core inflation.
There are seven boxes in this report. The first describes the basic features of the 
macroeconomic projections for the Spanish economy. The next three address issues 
relating to the external environment of the Spanish economy, analysing recent developments 
in emerging economies, evaluating the implications of the shift towards more expansionary 
policies in China and assessing the possible role that supply restrictions may play in the 
euro area given its current position in the cycle. The last three boxes focus on issues 
relating to the Spanish economy, assessing the outlook for the saving rate, analysing the 
slowdown in non-resident tourism during 2018 and describing the recent developments in 
the consumer credit market.
2017 2018
2016 2017 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3
National Accounts
Quarter-on-quarter rates of change, unless otherwise indicated
6.06.07.07.07.09.08.01.33.3tcudorp citsemod ssorG    
6.08.07.06.08.07.01.18.25.2)b( dnamed lanoitan fo noitubirtnoC    
1.0-2.0-0.01.01.0-2.03.0-3.07.0)b( dnamed lanretxe ten fo noitubirtnoC    
Year-on-year rates of change
2.25.26.29.29.29.26.28.20.3tnemyolpmE    
2.23.23.12.18.16.11.20.23.0-PCIH   
9.00.12.19.03.14.18.02.17.0doof dna ygrene .lcxe PCIH   
Price indicators (y-o-y change in end-of-period data) (c)
MAIN SPANISH MACROECONOMIC AGGREGATES (a) TABLE 1
SOURCES: INE and Banco de España.
a Information available to 24 September 2018.
b Contribution to the quarter-on-quarter rate of change of GDP (pp).
c Latest available figure for consumer price indices: August 2018.
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This box contains the update to the Banco de España’s 
macroeconomic projections for the Spanish economy published 
on 15 June,1 including information that has become available 
since then. Specifically, the projections presented here incorporate 
the preliminary results of the Quarterly National Accounts for the 
second quarter of 2017, and the changes observed in the 
assumptions on which the projections are based (see Table 1).2
The current projections foresee the growth phase that began in 
late 2013 continuing over the period 2018-2020. This outlook for a 
continuation of the current economic expansion is supported by 
progress on correcting macro-financial imbalances. In particular, 
the economy’s competitiveness gains have allowed the 
composition of GDP to be refocused from the demand-side 
perspective towards exports, making it possible for the expansion 
of activity and reduction of prevailing high levels of unemployment 
to be compatible with maintaining an external surplus. At the same 
time, private agents have been able to reconcile their spending 
plans with a reduction in their debt.
Against this positive backdrop, it is expected that the economy 
will continue to grow at above its potential rate, supported by the 
expansionary stance of demand-side policies, as reflected in the 
persistence of the accommodative monetary policy stance and, in 
the short term, the budgetary policy measures set out in the 2018 
State Budget.
Nevertheless, it is expected that output growth will tend to 
moderate over the course of the projection horizon. From the 
standpoint of demand-side policies, the projected upturn in euro-
area inflation resulting from the gradual widening of the output gap, 
reduces the likelihood of there being additional monetary stimulus, 
although the effects of the monetary policy measures implemented 
in recent years will continue to be felt. Additionally, the projection 
exercise assumes that the expansionary fiscal policy measures 
adopted in the first half of the year will support growth over the 
period 2018-2019, while in the absence of medium-term budgetary 
plans, fiscal policy is assumed to take a neutral stance in the final 
year of the projection. Lastly, the household saving rate is expected 
to recover from its current levels close to its all-time low, leading to 
BOX 1 MACROECONOMIC PROJECTIONS FOR SPAIN (2018-2020)
2017 2018 2019 2020 2018 2019 2020
International environment
0.02.0-1.0-4.35.37.36.3tuptuo dlroW    
1.0-5.0-9.0-7.38.35.39.4stekram tropxe s'niapS    
2.30.21.1-9.175.574.374.45)level( lerrab/srallod ni ecirp liO    
Monetary and financial conditions
20.0-20.0-10.0-61.161.191.131.1)level( etar egnahcxe orue/ralloD    
    Spain's nominal effective exchange rate vis-à-vis the world including the euro area
    (2000 = 100 and percentage differences) (c) 114.6 117.9 118.6 118.6 0.5 1.1 1.1
2.0-1.0-0.01.02.0-3.0-3.0-)d( )ROBIRUE htnom-3( etar tseretni mret-trohS    
1.0-1.0-1.0-0.27.14.16.1)d( )dleiy dnob raey-01( etar tseretni mret-gnoL    
Difference between the 
current projections and those 
made in June 2018 (b)
September 2018 projections
Table 1
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND MONETARY AND FINANCIAL CONDITIONS (a)
Annual rates of change, unless otherwise indicated
SOURCES: ECB and Banco de España.
a Assumptions cut-off date: 14 September 2018. The figures expressed as levels are annual averages; the figures expressed as rates are calculated based on the 
relevant annual averages.
b Differences are between rates in the case of world output and export markets, between levels in the case of oil prices and the dollar/euro exchange rate, 
percentage differences for the effective nominal exchange rate and percentage point differences in the case of interest rates.
c A positive percentage change in the nominal effective exchange rate denotes an appreciation of the euro.
d For the projection period, the figures in the table are technical assumptions, prepared using the Eurosystem's methodology. These assumptions are based on 
futures market prices or on proxies thereof and should not be interpreted as a Eurosystem prediction as to the course of these variables.
1  Macroeconomic projections for the Spanish economy (2018-2020): the 
Banco de España’s contribution to the Eurosystem’s June 2018 joint 
forecasting exercise.
2  The June publication was based on the information for the variables 
underlying the forecasts available as at 22 May. In the case of the current 
projections, the information referring to developments in Spain’s export 
markets is that prepared by ECB staff for the publication of the ECB staff 
macroeconomic projections for the euro area, September 2018, for 
which the cut-off date was 21 August. For their part, the data on the 
remainder of the assumptions used in preparation of the projections 
were updated on 14 September. Finally, information available as at 21 
September was used in the preparation of the projections. However, 
explicit use has not been made of the information in the revised Annual 
National Accounts published by the National Statistics Office (INE) on 6 
September. The reason is that the models used to prepare the projections 
require quarterly series, and on the cut-off date for these projections 
quarterly series consistent with the latest annual information were not 
yet available.
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a further moderation in consumer spending in addition to that seen 
since 2017. The short-term information available suggests that 
GDP growth in the third quarter may have been 0.6%, as in the 
second quarter. The slight growth moderation forecast for the 
following quarters would slow output growth from 2.6% in 2018 to 
2.2% and 2% in each of the two following years.
Inflation is projected to follow a downward path in annual average 
HICP growth terms over the projection horizon, with rates of 1.8%, 
1.7% and 1.5%, respectively, in each of the three years 
considered.3 This downward trajectory of the headline indicator is 
mainly driven by the slowdown in the energy component, primarily 
explained by the downward oil futures curve. By contrast, the core 
inflation component is expected to pick up as the period in which 
output is expanding at above its trend rate continues and leads to 
ever higher capacity utilisation. Specifically, HICP excluding 
energy and food, is projected to rise by 1% this year, before 
accelerating to 1.4% and 1.8% in the following two years.
Overall, relative to the June projections, the changes in the 
assumptions underlying the forecast have a negative impact on 
activity and an approximately neutral impact on prices. The most 
significant change in the assumptions is the markedly less dynamic 
BOX 1 MACROECONOMIC PROJECTIONS FOR SPAIN (2018-2020) (cont’d)
Difference between the current 
projections and those made 
in June 2018
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4.0-9.0-0.2-1.49.36.20.52.5secivres dna sdoog fo stropxE
5.0-6.0-4.1-0.40.41.37.46.5secivres dna sdoog fo stropmI
National demand (contribution to growth) 2.9 2.8 2.7 2.1 1.9 0.2 -0.1 -0.1
Net external demand (contribution to growth) 0.1 0.3 -0.1 0.1 0.1 -0.3 -0.1 0.0
2.0-2.0-5.0-8.39.37.30.43.4PDG lanimoN
1.0-0.04.0-8.17.10.10.12.1rotalfed PDG
Harmonised index of consumer prices (HICP) 2.0 2.0 1.8 1.7 1.5 -0.2 0.0 -0.1
HICP excluding energy and food 1.2 1.2 1.0 1.4 1.8 -0.4 -0.3 -0.2
2.0-2.0-0.07.19.14.28.29.2)stnelaviuqe emit-lluf( tnemyolpmE
Unemployment rate (% of labour force).
End-of-period data 16.5 16.5 14.6 13.2 11.9 0.0 0.2 0.5
Unemployment rate (% of labour force).
Average data 17.2 17.2 15.3 13.8 12.4 0.1 0.4 0.6
Nation's net lending (+) / net borrowing (-) (% of GDP) — 2.0 1.3 1.1 1.1 -0.3 -0.5 -0.4
General goverment's net lending (+) / net borrowing (-)
(% of GDP) — -3.1 -2.8 -2.5 -2.2 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2
September 2018 projections
Table 2
PROJECTIONS OF THE SPANISH ECONOMY'S MAIN MACRO MAGNITUDES (a)
Annual rate of change in volume terms and % of GDP
SOURCES: Banco de España and INE.
Latest QNA data: 2018 Q2.
a Projections cut-off date: 21 September 2018.
b The rates of change in 2017 that refer to the National Accounts series have been updated to include the revision of the Annnual National Accounts for the years 
2015-2017 published by the INE on 6 September. The new figures for net lending / net borrowing of the nation and of the general government will be published 
on 28 September.
3  Until recently, the benchmark variables used by the Directorate General 
Economics, Statistics and Research (DGEE) of the Banco de España to 
analyse and forecast the behaviour of consumer prices in Spain were the 
national definition of the consumer price index (CPI) and an index
   derived from it by excluding prices of energy and unprocessed food, as 
an accompanying measure of core inflation (IPSEBENE, by its Spanish 
abbreviation). The note “Reference variables for analysing inflation in 
Spain” explains why the DGEE opted to replace the previous measures 
by the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP), as an overall 
measure of changes in consumer prices, and the indicator derived from 
it excluding energy and food prices, as a measure of changes in core 
inflation.
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performance of export markets, with expected growth 1.5 pp 
lower in cumulative terms over the period 2018-2020 than was 
projected three months ago. This deterioration in the outlook for 
global trade and activity is more pronounced in the case of the 
more vulnerable emerging market economies, which have started 
to feel the effects of the uncertainty generated by the successive 
announcements of the introduction of protectionist measures, and 
also of the tightening financial conditions in these economies, 
resulting from the shift towards a less expansionary monetary 
policy stance in the United States.4 Moreover, measured in euro, 
the oil price is now projected to be higher in 2019 and 2020, which 
also helps explain the weakening of the Spanish economy’s 
momentum compared to the June projections. Conversely, the 
downward revision of short and long-term interest rates, in line 
with the expectations implicit in the yield curves, results in a slight 
cheapening of lending to households, according to the equations 
linking bank lending rates to these market rates.
There are only minor changes to the public finance assumptions over 
the projection horizon compared to the previous exercise. Fiscal 
policy projections for 2018 are based on measures adopted in the 
budgets of the various different tiers of government for this year,5 
together with the available information on their execution. As regards 
the assumptions for the remainder of the projection horizon, on the 
cut-off date for these projections, the draft 2019 State and Social 
Security budget had not been submitted. This being the case, we 
opted to use various technical assumptions to estimate the fiscal 
variables for the period 2019-2020. First, the impact of the measures 
approved in 2018, but with effects on the following years, was 
considered, such as the 2019 pension increase of 1.6% adopted in 
the 2018 State budget, the public sector employment and salary 
agreement between the government and main unions in the sector 
for the period 2018-2020, and the deferred effects of changes in 
personal income tax regulations. Second, it was assumed that those 
budgetary items subject to greater discretionality – such as public 
investment and procurement, in particular, given their volume – will 
grow in line with the nominal growth potential of the Spanish 
economy.6 Finally, it was assumed that, in the absence of specific 
measures, the course of the remaining items in the general 
government accounts will be shaped by the usual factors.7
According to these assumptions and forecasts of the fiscal policy 
variables and the output gap estimated in a way consistent with 
the other macroeconomic projections, the fiscal policy stance is 
expected to be expansionary in 2018 and 2019, after its 
approximately neutral stance in 2017.
Current GDP growth projections entail downward revisions from 
the previous projection of 0.1 pp, 0.2 pp and 0.1 pp in 2018, 2019 
and 2020, respectively. The scale of the revision is similar to that 
which, based on historical evidence, would derive from the impact 
of the changes in the various assumptions shaping the projection.8 
This is mainly a consequence of the worsening outlook for 
developments in Spain’s export markets and, to a lesser extent, 
rising oil prices. By contrast, the further cut in the cost of borrowing 
by private agents exerts a slightly expansionary effect.
As in the case of GDP, the sign of the revision of the main demand 
components is also negative in cumulative terms over the 
projection horizon as a whole.9 First, the worse expected 
performance of export markets translates into less buoyant 
exports. Also, the drop in external demand and the adverse effects 
of the increased uncertainty from the international environment on 
private agents’ spending decisions have led to a slight downward 
revision of the main components of domestic demand. In turn, 
weaker final demand goes hand in hand with weaker imports.
Regarding inflation, the current projections for HICP growth represent 
a downward revision of 0.2 pp in 2018 and of 0.1 pp in 2020, while 
the annual average projected for 2019 remains unchanged. These 
relatively modest revisions are influenced by a combination of factors 
of opposite signs. Specifically, the energy component has been 
revised up over the entire projection horizon. In the near term, this is 
because, in recent months, energy prices have shown a more 
dynamic performance than was estimated in the previous projection 
exercise, while the higher energy goods inflation expected over the 
rest of the projection horizon is due to the higher expected levels of 
crude prices according to the futures markets. The projections for 
the core HICP component (which excludes energy and food prices) 
have been revised down as a result of the weaker demand 
momentum and the recent forecasting errors in this component, 
especially as regards services, which suggest that the response of 
inflation to the widening of the output gap could be more moderate 
than foreseen to date in the projections.
As has been the case since the start of the recovery, expenditure 
on consumer goods and services is expected to continue to be 
BOX 1 MACROECONOMIC PROJECTIONS FOR SPAIN (2018-2020) (cont’d)
4  See Box 2 (Recent turbulence in emerging markets) in this edition of the 
Quarterly report on the Spanish economy.
5  For a detailed description, see Box  5 of the Quarterly report on the 
Spanish economy 2/2018 (June).
6  In a similar vein, the general government investment forecast for 2019 
includes the estimate stated in the Stability Programme 2018-2021 of 
income in the order of €1 billion for the re-tendering of toll motorways 
that were taken under government management as a result of the 
bankruptcy proceedings this year.
7  Specifically, it is assumed that government revenue will grow in line with 
tax bases, which mainly depend on the macroeconomic context. Similar 
assumptions are made for those less discretionary expenditure items. 
This is the case of pensions (basically driven by population ageing and, in 
2020, by the pension revaluation index, the revaluation formula 
established in the current legislation), unemployment benefits (which 
depend mainly on changes in the unemployment rate) and interest (which 
changes according to the level of government debt and interest rates).
8  Moreover, the preliminary Quarterly National Accounts (QNA) data for 
2018 Q2 estimate the Spanish economy’s output growth in the period to 
have been 0.6% in quarter-on-quarter terms. This is 0.1 pp lower than 
expected in the June projections, which also has a negative impact on 
the average GDP growth rate for the year as a whole.
9  Nevertheless, in the case of certain demand components (investment in 
capital goods, in particular), the preliminary estimate from the second 
quarter QNA was a positive surprise, with an automatic effect of the 
same sign on average annual growth rates in 2018, tending to offset the 
adverse impact of the new assumptions for this year.
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underpinned by the favourable labour market performance, the 
steady improvement in households’ financial wealth (assisted by 
the gradual deleveraging process) and the continued favourable 
financial conditions, in terms both of the availability and the cost 
of borrowed funds, reflected in the growing proportion of credit-
based consumer spending.10 In addition, especially in the near 
term, households’ current expenditure will benefit from the positive 
effect on households’ income of the entry into force of various 
budgetary measures contained in the State budget for 2018, such 
as the salary increase for public sector employees, the more 
dynamic employment performance in the general government 
sector or the decisions adopted on revaluation of pensions. 
Nevertheless, private consumption is expected to decelerate over 
the projection horizon, as the result of a combination of a variety of 
factors. First, the projected slowdown in GDP will, naturally, be 
accompanied by slower employment generation. Second, 
although in terms of labour income growth the projected 
acceleration in real wages will tend to offset the lower employment 
momentum expected, the composition of that labour income 
growth over the projection horizon will tend to become less 
favourable to household expenditure than it was in the past, given 
that, on the evidence available, consumer spending tends to be 
less responsive when a given increase in labour income stems 
from rising real wages rather than from rising employment. Lastly, 
the reversal of some of the factors that have driven down the 
saving rate in recent years will also help to moderate the pace of 
growth of private consumption.11
Residential investment is set to continue to record high rates of 
growth, against a backdrop of continued highly favourable 
conditions for taking out mortgages. However, some deceleration 
in this demand component is expected over the projection horizon, 
since the strong pace of growth in the recent period, combined 
with the decline in the saving rate, has led to the emergence of 
household net borrowing (albeit on a small scale). In the projection 
period, the increase in saving and the lower momentum of 
residential investment will allow household net borrowing to 
stabilise around its current levels. Business investment will be 
encouraged by the plentiful generation of internal funds and the 
availability of low-cost funding, but this component will also 
decelerate somewhat, in keeping with the lower final demand 
momentum. In addition, the heightened uncertainty about the 
global economy will also tend to hold back non-financial 
corporations’ investment decisions.
Sales of non-tourism goods and services to the rest of the world are 
expected to grow relatively moderately over the projection horizon, in 
keeping with the deterioration of the outlook for foreign markets. 
Nevertheless, exports of these products should continue to grow 
slightly faster than their destination markets, as a result of the increase 
in the number of firms which, once they have begun to export to a 
certain market, are able to continue to do so years later and to 
substantially increase the volumes sold. As for exports of tourism 
services, after the recent slowdown linked to the recovery of various 
alternative destinations and, to a lesser extent, to the signs of 
saturation in certain areas of Spain, rates of growth are expected to 
stabilise over the projection horizon.12 Lastly, in the case of imports, it 
continues to be assumed that they will grow at a slightly slower pace 
than their historical relationship with final demand would warrant. 
Employment will continue to record the high growth rates that are 
customary in upturns in the Spanish economy, allowing the 
unemployment rate to drop somewhat below 12% by the end of 
the projection horizon.
The economy’s net lending position, which in 2017 amounted to 
2% of GDP, will decline this year to around 1.3% and is expected 
to remain close to that figure over the rest of the projection horizon. 
This moderation in the external balance, concentrated on the 
balance of goods and services, would be as a result both of the 
deterioration observed this year in net trade flows in real terms and 
the deterioration in terms of trade, against a backdrop of rising oil 
prices. It is estimated that the budget deficit could amount to 2.8% 
of GDP this year, 0.1  pp more than envisaged in the June 
projections, given that the slowdown in activity in the final stretch 
of the year is expected to affect the strength of tax bases and, 
therefore, tax revenue. In subsequent years, under the assumptions 
described above and the favourable cyclical conditions, the budget 
deficit may be expected to experiment a further slight decline.
The current projections for consumer prices point to a gradual 
increase in core inflation, measured by the annual rate of change 
in the HICP excluding energy and food, from 1% in 2018 to 1.8% 
in 2020. This increase is consistent with the projected widening of 
the positive output gap, given that GDP is expected to grow above 
its potential rate throughout the projection period. From the cost 
standpoint, it is estimated that wage growth will tend to accelerate 
as labour market slack decreases and in line with the 
recommendations of the Employment and Collective Bargaining 
Agreement for 2018-2020 entered into by the social partners in 
June. This gradually increasing rate of growth in wages can be 
expected to pass through to unit labour costs, since no significant 
increase in productivity above its current low rates is expected 
over the projection period. In addition, it is estimated that profit 
margins (measured as the difference between the rates of growth 
of the GDP deflator and unit labour costs) will stabilise. External 
inflationary pressures, which have been high in 2018 as a result of 
higher oil prices, should moderate significantly in coming quarters, 
in keeping with the path of oil prices on the futures markets, an 
effect that will dominate the expected trajectory of consumer 
prices in the period. Overall, the HICP is expected to rise by 1.8% 
this year, peaking in Q3, before starting to decelerate, to reach 
1.7% in 2019 and 1.5% in 2020.
BOX 1 MACROECONOMIC PROJECTIONS FOR SPAIN (2018-2020) (cont’d)
10  See Box  7 (Recent developments in the consumer credit market in 
Spain) in this edition of the Quarterly report on the Spanish economy.
11  See Box  5 (The household saving rate in Spain: developments and 
outlook) in this edition of the Quarterly report on the Spanish economy.
12  See Box 6 (The slowdown in non-resident tourism in 2018 to date) in 
this edition of the Quarterly report on the Spanish economy.
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The risks to the baseline scenario for growth in activity are on the 
downside. On the external front, two of the risks identified in 
previous projection exercises – the adverse repercussions of the 
US economic policy mix on global financial conditions and the 
application of trade protectionism measures – have started to 
materialise and have already had an impact on the baseline 
scenario, triggering a downward revision of the ECB staff 
projections for GDP growth worldwide and for the euro area and 
of the Banco de España’s projections for the Spanish economy. 
However, it is still possible that these two elements may have a 
more negative impact in the future. Other external risk factors for 
the Spanish economy are a hypothetical “no deal” outcome from 
the ongoing negotiations between the United Kingdom and the 
European Union to establish the framework for their future 
relations and for the transition period, and also the possible 
resurgence of concerns regarding the future trajectory of Italian 
budgetary policy.
On the domestic front, there is still a high level of uncertainty regarding 
the future economic policy stance, in view of the current parliamentary 
fragmentation. In addition, a hypothetical increase in uncertainty 
associated with the tense political situation in Catalonia poses an 
added risk to economic growth, particularly in Catalonia itself.
The limited progress made to date in the necessary process of 
correcting the high level of public debt remains an important 
element of vulnerability. Against the present backdrop of fiscal 
policy uncertainty, it should be stressed that decisions on spending 
instruments and public revenue must be compatible with the need 
to reduce public debt and to create some headroom for the 
introduction of stabilising fiscal policy measures should the 
macroeconomic situation deteriorate. In addition, the instruments 
to be used to underpin the necessary fiscal consolidation process 
should minimise, insofar as possible, any potential adverse effects 
on economic growth.
Moreover, it is also necessary to reinstate a structural reform 
agenda, to boost the efficiency of the main factor and product 
markets. This agenda should have two main priorities: first, to 
correct aspects of the judicial and institutional framework that are 
sapping the Spanish economy’s growth potential; and second, to 
preserve the regulatory measures that were introduced in response 
to the crisis, which have underpinned the strength of the recovery 
and have, via competitiveness gains, made it compatible with an 
external surplus and strong job creation. 
The risks to inflation in the baseline scenario are slightly on the 
downside, as a consequence of a hypothetical materialisation of 
the risks of the same sign weighing on activity. By contrast, if any 
of the currently latent geopolitical conflicts were to intensify, the 
prices of imported goods, and especially of energy inputs, could 
rise, with the consequent upward impact on consumer prices. 
BOX 1 MACROECONOMIC PROJECTIONS FOR SPAIN (2018-2020) (cont’d)
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Since the episode known as the “taper tantrum”1 in May 2013 until 
last spring emerging markets have remained notably stable. 
Although there were some negative reactions to both global and 
idiosyncratic shocks, over time these became less substantial, 
shorter and more restricted to a smaller geographical area (see 
Chart 1). The decrease in the vulnerabilities of these economies in 
various aspects – such as the reduction of political instability, the 
greater soundness of their banking systems or their lower 
dependence on external financing –, the absence of monetary 
policy surprises in the advanced markets and the rebound of 
growth and global commerce explain, to a large extent, these 
developments.
However, the situation changed in mid-April 2018. In the United 
States, the interaction between the process of monetary policy 
normalisation and the fiscal expansion approved by the current 
administration led to an increase in short and long-term rates, to 
substantial capital inflows and to a strong appreciation of the 
dollar, factors which have tightened global financial conditions. 
This new environment is particularly adverse for emerging 
economies which still have strong external imbalances (high 
current account deficits and external debt) and relatively low 
volumes of international reserves.
The deterioration in the emerging financial markets became more 
pronounced during the summer months, in the face of growing 
concerns associated with the adoption of protectionist measures 
and rising geopolitical tensions. The worsening occurred in two 
phases, with an initial temporary episode of increased volatility 
around mid-June and a subsequent one, starting at end-July, 
triggered by the problems specific to Argentina and Turkey and, to 
a lesser extent, by those of other large emerging market 
economies. This led, in the third quarter of the year, to a strong 
outflow of capital ($25 billion, especially in equities – see Chart 2) 
and a stagnation of fixed-income issuance (declining by 54% in 
comparison with summer last year).
Although most emerging countries were affected by these events, 
some degree of market discrimination has been observed (see 
Chart 3). Thus, the countries whose stock market prices underwent 
more corrections were those that were more integrated in global 
trade and, in particular, in China’s production chain. Specifically, 
the Asian stock market as a whole fell from mid-April by 11% (with 
sharper declines in Hong Kong, Korea and China). The currencies 
which depreciated the most against the dollar were those of 
countries with more internal or external vulnerabilities, such as the 
Argentine peso (-29%), the Turkish lira (-27%), the South African 
rand (-13%) the Russian rouble (-11%) and the Brazilian real 
(-8.5%) (see Chart 4). Conversely, the Mexican peso appreciated 
by almost 7% since mid-June, following the presidential elections 
and the preliminary agreement reached for a new trade deal with 
the United States. In contrast with these changes in the stock 
market and exchange markets, sovereign spreads and the implied 
probability of default in sovereign CDS prices have hardly changed, 
except in Turkey and Argentina.
Overall, the magnitude of the most recent phase of turbulence is 
comparable to that observed when the Chinese stock exchange 
experienced a profound correction in 2015, although it is still 
clearly milder than that evidenced during the “taper tantrum” (see 
Chart 1). Also, unlike during that event, a widespread sell off has 
not been observed yet. The factors that are containing the effects 
of the current bout of volatility on the emerging economies as a 
whole include the high volume of international reserves – which, 
excluding China, is very close to the all-time high in 2013 (see 
Chart  5) –, the improvement in economic fundamentals and, 
especially, the authorities’ response to the turbulence.
However, Turkey and Argentina, the two most affected economies, 
have certain idiosyncratic elements of vulnerability. In Turkey – where 
GDP grew by 7.3% in 2017, inflation is around 18% and the current 
account deficit stands at around 6% of GDP – the main source of 
vulnerability comes from foreign currency indebtedness of the 
private non-financial sector, partly channelled through banks whose 
balance sheets display a very high and growing short-term debt 
burden in foreign currency, which is reflected in a strong worsening 
of their net external position (see Chart 6). Dependence on external 
finance has grown as a result of the guarantees provided by the 
State for the granting of certain loans. Although banks’ net foreign 
currency funding positions were provisioned in their balance sheets, 
some of these foreign currency loans were granted to firms in non-
tradable sectors for which, therefore, there are few natural hedges 
against the strong exchange rate depreciation currently experienced 
by this economy, which could derive in an increase in non-performing 
loans. Against this backdrop, uncertainties about central bank 
independence and the mounting political tension with the United 
States, which led to a series of trade sanctions, triggered a very 
negative reaction in the markets. Initially, the response from the 
authorities focused on alleviating the banking sector’s situation at 
short term. Regulatory changes easing the classification criteria for 
loans in default were introduced, the calculation of capital at non-
current exchange rates was allowed and the cost of short positions 
in lira was increased, thereby providing liquidity to the system 
through the reduction of reserve requirements. Additionally, a 
bilateral loan was arranged with Qatar, which announced a €15 billion 
direct investment in Turkey, and the two central banks entered into a 
swap agreement for an additional €3 billion.
In Argentina, both the sources of vulnerability and the response from 
the authorities were different. Specifically, it was the public sector 
which had significantly increased its foreign indebtedness in recent 
years, thanks to ample international liquidity and a high global 
appetite for risk (see Chart 7). The new government aimed to reduce 
the large inherited imbalances through a budgetary programme 
BOX 2 RECENT TURBULENCE IN EMERGING MARKETS
1  “Taper tantrum” is the term used for the period of instability in the 
financial markets which followed the Federal Reserve’s announcement 
that it would gradually reduce the volume of Treasury bond purchases 
within the framework of its quantitative easing programme. The financial 
markets reacted to this announcement with a strong appreciation of the 
dollar against emerging economies’ currencies and high capital outflows 
from these economies.
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BOX 2 RECENT TURBULENCE IN EMERGING MARKETS (cont’d)
SOURCES: Banco de España, Datastream, IIF and JP Morgan.
a The bars denote an increase in the risk premium, falls in stock markets and exchange rate depreciation. The dates refer to the collapse of Lehman Brothers 
(September 2008), the taper tantrum (May 2013), the plunge in oil prices (October and November 2014), China's stock market crash (July and August 2015) 
and Trump's US presidential election victory (November 2016).
b Weekly changes following the onset of the event indicated in note (a).
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whose pace of adjustment was so gradual that it was hardly able to 
reduce the structural primary deficit. Confidence in the correction of 
imbalances was further damaged when the government eased its 
inflation targets and the central bank lowered interest rates. Against 
this background, tightening international financial conditions and a 
severe drought which reduced agricultural production and exports 
gave rise to a strong capital outflow and a depreciation of the peso 
which the authorities tried to counter through foreign exchange 
market intervention, higher official rates and, finally, the request for 
assistance from the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
The Spanish economy’s exposure to these two economies through 
the trade channel is moderate, with the foreign investment and 
banking channels being more important (see Chart 8). Specifically, 
in 2017 Turkey was the eleventh export market for Spain (the 
fourth outside the EU) and Argentina was the 35th. Spanish goods 
exports to Turkey that year, mainly consisting of manufactured 
goods, accounted for 21% of the total (0.5% of GDP, slightly lower 
than the 0.6% relating to the EU) and grew at a slower pace than 
imports. Sales of goods to Argentina only accounted for 0.5% of 
Spain’s total goods exports (0.1% of GDP), although they grew 
more than imports. As regards financial relationships, Turkey is the 
19th most important market in direct investment, accounting for 
1.2% of Spanish total assets abroad, concentrated in the banking 
and insurance sectors (40% and 12%, respectively, of the total). 
Argentina accounts for 2.6% of total direct investment assets 
abroad (ranking 12th), with predominance of the financial and 
telecommunications sectors.
During the early weeks of September, emerging markets overall 
tended to stabilise. Several central banks’ responses, in the form 
of raising policy rates (Czech Republic, Indonesia, India and 
Philippines), intervention in the foreign exchange markets (India 
and Hong Kong) and a series of measures adopted by China to 
sustain short-term growth and stabilise the renminbi, contributed 
to calm the markets. The two countries most affected by the 
shocks have also adopted orthodox economic measures. Thus, 
Turkey’s central bank raised interest rates significantly, to 24%, 
while Argentina’s monetary authority increased the policy interest 
rate to 60%. The Argentine government also announced an 
important fiscal adjustment (seeking to obtain a balanced budget 
in 2019 and a primary surplus of 1% of GDP in 2020) and at the 
same time requested an advance on the disbursement of funds 
envisaged in the agreement entered into with the IMF.
BOX 2 RECENT TURBULENCE IN EMERGING MARKETS (cont’d)
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In recent years China has made progress in reducing the imbalances 
in its economy. The readjustment has been significant (see Charts 1 
and 2) as regards both expenditure (with a decline in the weight of 
investment, from accounting for 48% of GDP growth in 2011 to 
35% in 2017, in favour of consumption) and branches of activity 
(with an increase in the weight of the services sector of more than 
10 pp during that period, to 60% of GDP growth, at the expense of 
industry). China has also adopted a set of policies since 2016 to 
reduce its high level of debt. These measures, particularly those 
relating to shadow banking, have reduced aggregate credit growth 
and stabilised debt, mainly that acquired by non-financial 
corporations, as a percentage of GDP (see Charts 3 and 4). 
However, this process is facing a series of difficulties in recent 
months, with economic activity performing less favourably both 
for internal reasons (partly owing to the deleveraging process 
itself) and for external ones (mounting trade tensions with the 
United States). Against this background, the Chinese authorities 
seem to be opting for ensuring growth at short term, even at the 
expense of slowing down the correction of imbalances. This box 
describes the policy measures adopted recently and analyses 
their implications for the process of rebalancing China’s economy.
The first clear sign of the new expansionary economic stance 
arose on the monetary front. At end-June, the People’s Bank of 
China (PBoC) reduced the reserve ratio by 50 bp. It also adopted 
a more expansionary tone in press releases relating to liquidity 
management. As a result of these two measures, the interbank 
rate declined to around 2.8%. Other regulatory changes relating to 
financial institutions (with less restrictive guidelines on the 
management of financial assets and products) and the lending 
policy were also agreed, including: i) laxer collateral eligibility 
criteria for loan facilities in monetary policy transactions; ii) 
adjustment of macroprudential assessment parameters to 
encourage lending; and iii) greater incentives for the granting of 
loans to SMEs and to local government financing vehicles.
BOX 3 SOME IMpLICaTIONS Of ThE aNNOUNCEd EXpaNSIONary STaNCE Of ChINa’S MaCrOECONOMIC 
pOLICIES
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As regards the fiscal policy, at end-July the State Council revealed 
plans to cut taxes to firms (in part through the deduction on R&D 
expenses). This amounts to 0.1% of annual GDP and is additional to 
the decrease in taxes and levies for an amount equivalent to 1.3% of 
GDP (announced in March), including most notably a decrease in 
income tax amounting to 0.4% of GDP. Also until June 2018 China 
had issued only 30% of the annual quota for local government 
special bonds and had incurred only 30% of the fiscal deficit target, 
which suggests that there is ample margin for a proactive fiscal 
policy in the future. In this connection, the State Council also advised 
local governments to speed up the issuance of special bonds 
(amounting to 1.6% of GDP) and encouraged financial institutions to 
cover the funding needs of local government financing vehicles 
aiming to finance infrastructure investment spending.
Finally, the recent depreciation of the renminbi has ambiguous 
effects on economic activity. On the one hand, it may favour 
exports; but, on the other it may have adverse effects on investor 
confidence, generating capital outflows. In fact, since mid-June, 
the PBoC appeared not to be intervening in the foreign exchange 
markets and, accordingly, depreciation was driven by the market, 
owing to divergences in growth expectations between the United 
States and China, the reduction in interest rate spreads and the 
escalating trade tensions between the two countries. However, in 
August the Chinese monetary authority apparently commenced to 
intervene in favour of the renminbi to anchor exchange rate 
expectations, reintroducing the so-called “counter-cyclical factor”1 
and raising the reserve requirement from 0% to 20% for foreign 
exchange transactions.
All of these measures, which were designed to stabilise growth in 
the near term, contribute to partially halt the process of reducing 
imbalances in the economy, which could increase the risks to 
growth in the medium and long term. Also, foreign exchange 
market intervention and capital flow controls could hamper the 
internationalisation of the renminbi and the full opening of the 
capital account. Nonetheless, it can be stated that their impact 
on the imbalances is, to date, very limited, although there is still 
no hard evidence that it has been possible to halt the deceleration 
of activity.
BOX 3 SOME IMpLICaTIONS Of ThE aNNOUNCEd EXpaNSIONary STaNCE Of ChINa’S MaCrOECONOMIC 
pOLICIES (cont’d)
1  The “counter-cyclical factor”, which aims to moderate short/medium-
term fluctuations in the renminbi’s exchange rate, was introduced by the 
PBoC in May 2017.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 18 ECONOMIC BULLETIN 3/2018 QUARTERLY REPORT ON THE SPANISH ECONOMY
After its strong performance in 2017, in the first half of 2018 
economic activity in the euro area slowed faster than had been 
expected at the end of last year, mainly as a consequence of weak 
exports in the current context of tightening global financial 
conditions, heightened global uncertainty and rising protectionism.1 
Nevertheless, GDP across the euro area as a whole continued to 
grow faster than potential output (which various estimates situate 
at rates of around 1.5%), enabling the output gap to turn 
increasingly positive this year (see Chart 1), after narrowing in the 
final months of 2017. This output gap trend can be extrapolated to 
the individual euro area countries (albeit to differing degrees) 
except in the case of Italy, where growth remains weak and the 
output gap is still negative.
Compared with other cycles observed since the 1970s, the 
process of recovering pre-recession levels of output has been 
slower,2 particularly in those countries most affected by the 
sovereign debt crisis, such as Italy and Spain. Moreover, the 
expansion observed since the trough in early 2013 has so far 
been shorter and growth weaker than the average for expansionary 
phases in other cycles, which seems to suggest that there is still 
scope for it to continue.3 Underlying this weak recovery is the 
sluggishness of all the GDP components, in particular exports 
and business investment (which only returned to pre-crisis levels 
for the euro area as a whole after a considerable delay, at the end 
of 2016) (see Chart 2). 
By contrast, the current phase of the cycle is strong in terms of job 
creation, partly as a result of wage moderation and of the 
comparatively large contribution to growth from sectors more 
labour-intensive, such as services. In this context, the European 
Commission’s business surveys point to a growing proportion of 
firms having difficulty finding labour (Chart 3). Also, levels of 
capacity utilisation have risen to historical highs in most countries. 
It is therefore worth asking to what extent supply side constraints 
are becoming increasingly binding.
Focusing on labour, since 2017, as noted above, there has been a 
significant increase across the euro area in the percentage of firms 
considering labour shortages to be a limiting factor on activity, in 
manufacturing as well as services and construction.4 This trend is 
relatively widespread across countries, although particularly 
marked in Germany, France and the Netherlands. Additional 
evidence of the possible emergence of supply side constraints in 
some countries and sectors comes from the job vacancy rate, 
which has been on an upward path since the end of 2014, 
suggesting hiring has become more difficult. This trend has 
nevertheless been compatible with persistently high levels of 
unemployment in certain countries, suggesting there is a problem 
of a mismatch between the skills required by firms and those that 
the unemployed can offer. In this connection, Chart 4 shows how, 
from a historical perspective, there is currently a higher percentage 
of firms reporting difficulties finding labour for the same level of 
unemployment.
In contrast with these signs of high levels of labour utilisation, the 
way other indicators have evolved points to a certain degree of 
slack remaining in the labour market, which would explain why until 
now labour shortages has been compatible with modest wage 
growth in the euro area. In this regard, a high level of involuntary 
part-time employment is observed in most countries, meaning that 
there is a relatively high percentage of part-time workers who 
would like to work more hours (Chart 5).5 This phenomenon would 
help to explain why the number of hours per worker remains at 
historically low levels in many countries, despite the increase in 
employment in terms of the number of persons employed (Chart 6).
It is therefore difficult to determine precisely the strength of 
possible supply side restrictions and their potential impact on 
growth in activity in some countries in the area. Nevertheless, 
although the labour supply indicator shows rising shortages 
across the euro area as a whole, the increase is still small: just 
20% of firms say they are concerned about labour shortages, less 
than the percentage pointing to insufficient demand as a limiting 
factor on activity. Furthermore, most firms consider there to be no 
factor limiting their activity at the moment (Chart 3), and this is so 
even in those countries with low unemployment rates, such as 
Germany. This all suggests that the degree to which supply-side 
constraints are increasingly binding is subject to strong 
heterogeneity between countries and industries, and possibly 
between individual firms.
Additionally, looking ahead, the role that the recent strong 
migratory inflows might play in alleviating possible labour market 
tightness in the euro area is unclear, given the current difficulty of 
estimating how employable these migrants are and their possible 
BOX 4 THE EURO AREA’S POSITION IN THE ECONOMIC CYCLE AND THE POSSIBLE ROLE OF SUPPLY-SIDE FACTORS
1  For a detailed analysis of the factors that may be behind the slowdown 
in the area’s GDP at the start of the year, see Box 2 “Has the slowdown 
in economic activity in the euro area been a result of permanent or 
temporary factors?, Economic Bulletin 2/2018, Quarterly report on the 
Spanish economy, Banco de España. 
2  The different cycles are not fully comparable. For example, after a deep 
recession, the recovery tends to be slow, and the subsequent expansion, 
longer lasting.
3  Applying a methodology similar to that used in Box 2 of ECB Economic 
Bulletin 4/2018 suggests that, in the euro area, the average duration of 
the expansions was 31 quarters, compared with 19 quarters in the 
current expansion, while the average intensity was 20 pp in GDP terms 
(9 pp in the current phase). 
4  In the third quarter of 2018, these percentages for the euro area as a 
whole were 16.7%, 19.2% and 20.6% in industry, services and 
construction, respectively.
5  In Germany and Italy, the percentage of involuntary part-time 
employment is fairly moderate, although the trend is heading in opposite 
directions: rising in Italy and decreasing in Germany. 
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BOX 4 THE EURO AREA’S POSITION IN THE ECONOMIC CYCLE AND THE POSSIBLE ROLE OF SUPPLY-SIDE FACTORS 
(cont’d)
SOURCE: European Commission.
a European Commission data (spring 2018).
b Cycles go from one peak to the next following the Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) chronology. Specifically, the periods considered are: Q3 1974 to 
Q1 1980; Q1 980 to Q2 1992; Q2 1992 to Q1 2008 and Q1 2008 to Q2 2018 (incomplete cycle).
c Average of factors limiting activity in services, industry and construction.
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BOX 4 THE EURO AREA’S POSITION IN THE ECONOMIC CYCLE AND THE POSSIBLE ROLE OF SUPPLY-SIDE FACTORS 
(cont’d)
difficulty in joining the labour force. Lastly, it is also unclear whether 
there is still room for the participation rate of certain population 
groups (such as women and young people) to rise in some 
countries, given that their values are still relatively low by 
international standards.
In short, the available evidence suggests that the possible supply 
side restrictions on some factors of production, particularly labour, 
in some sectors of certain core euro area economies are not 
sufficiently intense at present to explain the slowdown in the euro 
area economy in the first half of this year. By contrast, this 
deceleration could be mainly reflecting demand factors relating to 
declining global demand for goods and services, and to adverse 
developments in agents’ confidence, against the backdrop of 
growing geopolitical tensions. Looking ahead, however, if the euro 
area’s growth proceeds according to current forecasts, which are 
consistent with growth at a pace exceeding its potential rate, 
supply side factors can be expected to start to play a progressively 
more significant role in shaping output growth. In turn, on the 
historical evidence, this should support a sustained rise in inflation 
rates towards levels compatible with the ECB’s aim to maintain 
inflation rates below, but close to, 2% over the medium term.
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The fluctuations in the saving rate of Spanish households since 
the onset of the crisis reflect how several factors, of variable 
strength and direction, have come together and influenced the 
consumption, saving and financing decisions of households in a 
particularly complex setting. In recent years, against a backdrop of 
subdued growth in household income, the saving rate in our 
country has fallen sharply to historically low levels. This decline 
has not been an isolated phenomenon in the euro area, where 
other countries have also shown a trend towards a lower level of 
saving (see Chart 1), especially those that were affected by a high 
degree of macrofinancial uncertainty during the crisis, such as 
Portugal and Ireland. This box reviews the available evidence on 
the decline in the household saving rate in recent years and its 
determinants.
At the start of the crisis, Spanish households had to make 
consumption, saving and financing decisions in a clearly adverse 
macroeconomic environment, characterised by a high degree of 
uncertainty1. In this context, the saving rate of households, as a 
percentage of their disposable income, rose by 7.5 percentage 
points (pp) between 2007 and 2009, to 13.4 % in 2009. Conversely, 
since 2010, this rate has fallen continuously and very sharply to 
below 6% of disposable income in 2017 (see Chart 2). Initially, the 
fall in the saving rate could be explained by factors such as the 
role of saving as a stabilising factor of the pattern of consumption 
over time which, in any event, diminished in aggregate terms, 
given the sharp decline in household income.
From 2014 on, however, household consumption began to 
increase, in a setting of strong recovery of employment. This 
upturn in the labour market led to a decrease in precautionary 
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SOURCES: INE, Eurostat and Banco de España.
a Projection dating from 2013 Q4. Observed income and wealth.
b Income, wealth, and financial conditions projections are the ones presented in this Economic Bulletin.
1  See Ó. Arce, E. Prades and A. Urtasun (2013), “Changes in household 
saving and consumption in Spain during the crisis”, Economic Bulletin, 
September, Banco de España. 
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saving, given the improved prospects of obtaining and maintaining 
a job. In addition, the increase in employment income entailed a 
clear boost to consumption, but had less impact on saving, in view 
of the changes in the composition of the consumption basket 
desired by households following the constraints of the crisis. 
Specifically, households increased the weight of spending 
earmarked for the purchase of consumer durables, a type of 
spending that had contracted significantly during the recessionary 
period, since it was less essential and thus easier to cut back on 
and postpone2. This led to a rebound effect on spending on such 
goods and services, which is estimated to have slowed  the 
recovery of saving.
Lastly, it is worth mentioning that developments in lending are also 
estimated to have influenced the path of saving in the last decade. 
The sharp fall in the consumption of durable goods at the beginning 
of the crisis seems to have reflected, in addition to the 
aforementioned voluntary reduction in purchases of this type of 
goods, a worsening in the conditions of access to financing for 
Spanish households3. In view of the greater difficulties to obtain 
credit, the reliance of the consumption of goods on household 
income increased significantly, directly affecting the saving rate. In 
parallel, since the beginning of the crisis, the level of household 
indebtedness has undergone a significant correction, which, in the 
most recent period, has led to a reduction in the weight of debt 
servicing, enabling households to maintain their consumption 
levels, with a lower rate of saving.
In short, in recent years, a broad set of factors have contributed to 
maintaining a low saving rate, which has, in part, underpinned 
household consumption. However, in the coming years, the 
household saving rate can be expected to return to levels that are 
closer to historical averages, as some of these determinants lose 
momentum.
To illustrate this, Charts 3 and 4 show the dynamic forecasts4 
obtained with the model5 for total consumption and household 
saving, beginning in 2014 Q1, and the changes actually observed 
in consumption and the saving rate. As the charts show, the path 
of the saving rate observed in the 2014-2017 period is fairly close 
to that envisaged by the model, which reflects the developments 
in its determining factors. Looking ahead, to the horizon for 2018 
to 20206, and in a scenario of a slowdown in household income 
growth, moderation of durable goods consumption and less 
favourable financial conditions, the saving rate can be expected to 
increase, according to this analysis. 
BOX 5 THE HOUSEHOLD SAVING RATE IN SPAIN: DEVELOPMENTS AND OUTLOOK (cont’d)
2  See J. M. Gonzalez Mínguez and A. Urtasun (2015), “Consumption 
dynamics in Spain by product type”, Economic Bulletin, September, 
Banco de España, and M. Martínez Matute and A. Urtasun (2017), “The 
recovery of private consumption in Spain by product type and 
household”, Economic Bulletin, 2/2017, Banco de España.
3  See Box 7, “Recent developments in the consumer credit market in 
Spain”, in this quarterly report.
4  Conditional on the observed paths of income, wealth and financial 
variables.
5  Results obtained using a VECM-type model, which includes the main 
determinants mentioned earlier. According to this model, consumption, 
employment income and wealth (financial and non-financial) are closely 
linked variables in the long term, that also interact in the short term, in 
which financing conditions are incorporated as an additional explanatory 
variable. The model contains equations for the consumption of durable 
and non-durable goods, employment income and non-financial wealth. 
See T. Sastre and J. L. Fernández-Sánchez (2005), “Un modelo empírico 
de las decisiones de gasto de las familias españolas”, Working Papers, 
No. 0529, Banco de España, and T. Sastre and J. L. Fernández-Sánchez 
(2011), “La tasa de ahorro durante la crisis económica: el papel de las 
expectativas de desempleo y de la financiación”, Economic Bulletin, 
November, Banco de España.
6  The projections for income, wealth and financial conditions are those 
presented in the updated Macroeconomic projections for the Spanish 
economy (2018-2020).
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In the 2016-17 two-year period, inbound tourism flows were 
extremely buoyant both in nominal and real terms. Specifically, 
over 2017 as a whole, the arrivals of tourists in Spain and their 
spending grew by 8.7% and 12.4%, respectively. However, so far 
in 2018, tourism sector indicators have slowed notably with the 
result that in the first seven months of the year arrivals of foreign 
tourists and their spending only increased by 0.3% and 3%, 
respectively, compared with the same period of 2017. Furthermore, 
this pattern of deceleration has intensified in more recent months. 
Notably, in July, the numbers of inbound tourists declined by 4.9% 
in year-on-year terms. The possible continuation of the latest 
trends over the next few months could lead to 2018 being the first 
year since 2009 that growth in tourism in Spain is lower than that 
of GDP (see Chart 1). The remainder of this box seeks to analyse 
the explanatory factors of recent developments in the behaviour of 
inbound tourism in Spain.
The main driving factors of tourism inflows include changes in the 
economic activity of the source countries for tourism, as a whole, 
where the latter are weighted as part of the total, as a scale 
variable, together with other variables that measure changes in 
costs and in prices relative to their competitors. The course of 
competitiveness is approximated by the real effective exchange 
rate vis-à-vis developed countries, which is constructed with 
consumer prices as an – albeit imperfect – indicator of the relative 
developments in the cost of goods and services acquired by 
foreign tourists in Spain compared with the cost of the same 
consumption basket in alternative tourist destinations. Further, the 
trajectory of oil prices, insofar as it is the main determinant of 
transport costs, helps to explain the performance of non-resident 
tourism.
Nevertheless, the highly robust demand of non-resident tourism 
seen in 2016-17 cannot be explained solely by changes in its 
fundamentals. In fact, although the strengthening of growth in the 
developed economies contributed positively over this period, higher 
oil prices and the appreciation of the euro had the opposite effect 
(see Chart 3). A simple econometric model which approximates the 
performance of Quarterly National Accounts (QNA) real tourist 
receipts based on these explanatory factors shows how changes in 
the income of source countries for tourism would account for around 
2 pp of the average growth in tourism services exports in the period 
2016-17. This is estimated to have been largely offset by the 
combined, somewhat smaller, contribution of the opposite sign from 
competitiveness and oil price variables (see Chart 4). As can be 
seen, all of the factors not specifically included in the model made a 
very high contribution to growth in tourism in 2016-17. In particular, 
the perceived lack of safety and security prevailing in certain 
competitor regions was foreseeably an essential reason for the 
outstanding performance of tourism in 2016-17. In fact, as a result of 
the geopolitical situation in certain areas of the Mediterranean basin 
such as Turkey and North Africa, significant tourism flows were 
diverted to other countries such as Spain (for Turkey, see Chart 5).
In the first two quarters of 2018, the resumption of the upward 
path of oil prices and the appreciation of the euro in nominal 
effective terms are estimated to have weighed on non-resident 
tourist arrivals through higher transport costs and the loss of 
competitiveness relative to non-euro area countries. This led to a 
slight widening of the negative contribution of these variables 
compared with the previous two-year period (see Chart 4). 
Furthermore, the positive contribution of the income in source 
countries decreased slightly which was linked to the slowdown in 
activity in the euro area (see Chart 2). However, as shown in 
Chart 4 the subdued buoyancy of tourism in the first half of 2018 
would be explained, especially, by the decline in the positive 
contribution of other factors, due, notably, to the geopolitical 
situation in the above-mentioned competitor destinations 
gradually returning to normal. As indicated by Chart 6, fewer 
tourists were arriving in Spain from the main European source 
countries at the same time as tourist inflows to destinations such 
as Turkey, in particular, were recovering significantly. Specifically, 
in the first seven months of the year, arrivals in Spain of German, 
British and French tourists declined, in year-on-year terms, by 
5.8%, 2.8% and 1.7%, respectively, in contrast to the arrivals in 
Turkey of tourists from each of these three countries which rose by 
20.5%, 37% and 24.1%1.
As mentioned earlier, inflows of foreign tourists slowed down 
slightly more sharply than average spending per tourist which 
seems to suggest that there is a small composition effect whereby 
the low-cost segment would have weakened relative to the higher-
spending segments. This may reflect that the recovery of other 
Mediterranean destinations has been based on the lower-end of 
the tourist market. In any event, the trend towards higher growth in 
average spending per tourist has already been observed over the 
last decade, along with an increase in the relative weight of stays 
in high-end hotels compared with mid-low end hotels (see Chart 7). 
These signs of a slight shift towards higher quality tourism could 
be part of the hoteliers’ response to the saturation of certain 
destinations on the coast and to some market innovations such as 
the emergence of the digital platforms of the sharing economy 
which compete for more-price sensitive tourist demand.
Tourism is very important in the Spanish economy and is a 
significant support for the external surplus. Specifically, although 
the slowdown seen this year has interrupted the recent rising 
trajectory, the share of tourism exports in GDP amounts, in nominal 
terms, to 4%, while the tourism services surplus has stabilised at 
2.9% of GDP (see Chart 8). The importance of tourism, in a highly 
competitive environment, underlines the significance for the sector 
of ongoing adaptation to market trends geared, in particular, to 
improving the supply of high added-value services, in order to 
achieve a sustained increase in receipts per visitor. This is 
particularly needed in a setting where, as indicated above, the 
saturation of certain destinations is restricting the growth of the 
total number of visitors.
BOX 6 THE SLOWDOWN IN NON-RESIDENT TOURISM IN 2018 TO DATE
1  In addition, it has been argued that certain temporary factors could be 
possible explanations for weak inbound tourism in Spain last summer, 
such as the world cup and the heat wave in large areas of central and 
northern Europe, which may have curbed last minute reservations.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 24 ECONOMIC BULLETIN 3/2018 QUARTERLY REPORT ON THE SPANISH ECONOMY
BOX 6 THE SLOWDOWN IN NON-RESIDENT TOURISM IN 2018 TO DATE (cont’d)
SOURCES: INE, Exceltur, Central Bank of Turkey, Eurostat and WTO.
a Composite indicator of Spanish tourism GDP and Spanish GDP, compiled by Exceltur.
b An increase in the index denotes a loss of competitiveness and vice versa.
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Since 2014, total outstanding consumer credit has followed a path 
of sustained recovery; by mid-2018 its year-on-year growth rate 
stood at around 14% (a rate that rises to 21% in the case of credit 
for consumer durables), and the cumulative increase since the end 
of 2014 has been 47%. This contrasts with the behaviour of other 
segments of lending to households, in particular, credit for house 
purchase, the amount of which is currently still contracting, 
although at an increasingly moderate rate (see Chart 1). The 
different behaviour of consumer credit is explained by the larger 
increase in lending activity in this segment in the recent period, as 
reflected in the fact that the volume of new lending has doubled 
since 2014 (see Chart 2), and also by the shorter maturities of this 
type of loan, in comparison with lending for house purchase, 
which means that the outstanding amounts react more rapidly to 
changes in activity.
As seen in Chart 3, unlike in the cyclical upturn before the last crisis, 
the current recovery in consumer credit is being driven by lending to 
finance spending on durables. In particular, as Chart 4 shows, the 
dynamics of spending on durables since the beginning of the crisis 
can largely be explained by the behaviour of sales of cars for private 
use (approximated by the path of new car registrations).1 
Charts 3 and 4 show that the behaviour of spending on durables 
and of lending to finance such spending is clearly cyclical. During 
the crisis, when economic expectations were sharply deteriorating, 
the contraction in these two aggregates was very intense, while, 
since the beginning of the recovery, they have both grown strongly. 
Chart 5 shows that, in comparison with spending on durables, this 
pro-cyclical behaviour is even more pronounced in the case of 
lending to finance such spending. Accordingly, the proportion of 
durable consumption financed out of future income is also cyclical, 
as is also reflected in the moderation of the household saving rate 
over the last few years (see Box 5 of this report).
The evidence available in the Bank Lending Survey, presented in 
Chart 6, suggests that the recent recovery in activity in the 
consumer credit market has been driven by the rise in both the 
supply of and the demand for funds. Both have increased, 
according to this source, at higher rates than those seen in the 
market for loans for house purchase. According to the banks that 
responded to the survey, the main reason for the expansion in 
supply was the increase in competition. This has occurred against 
a background of low margins and reference interest rates, with the 
spread between the rates on new consumer credit and credit for 
house purchase remaining relatively steady at around 6 pp (18 pp 
in the case of credit card credit, which continues to represent less 
than 10% of total consumer credit).2
Following the recent developments in consumer credit, the 
outstanding amount stood in mid-2018, in real terms per 
household, at close to its 2004 levels, although it was still well 
below the previous cyclical peak (32% below the level recorded in 
2008 Q1, see Chart 1). At the same time, the above-mentioned 
evidence also suggests that financing for car purchases has also 
gained weight during the current upturn.
To sum up, the data analysed in this box show that the consumer 
credit market has contributed to the economic recovery in recent 
years, mainly by financing the increase in the consumption of 
durable goods and, in particular, that linked to the acquisition of 
vehicles. However, as highlighted by the last crisis, rapid increases 
in lending can entail risks for future financial and macroeconomic 
stability, by raising agents’ vulnerability to adverse shocks. In the 
latest case, although these developments have been compatible 
with a pattern of deleveraging by households and consumer credit 
continues to have a low weight in financial institutions’ total 
lending (around 5%), it should also be taken into account that the 
absence of collateral in this type of lending, except in the case of 
loans for car purchase, raises the risk for such institutions. To 
minimise these risks it is important that the decisions of lenders 
and borrowers that lie behind the dynamism of the consumer 
credit market be based on prudent expectations regarding the 
ability to repay this debt.
BOX 7 RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CONSUMER CREDIT MARKET IN SPAIN
1  This is in contrast to the years leading up to 2008, when the increase in 
spending on durables was determined to a greater extent by the increase 
in spending on household appliances associated with the expanding 
property market.
2  Although the recent expansion in the supply of consumer credit 
according to the BLS seems, by historical standards, to be moderate, it 
should be borne in mind that this type of survey tends to underestimate 
movements involving an easing of supply conditions.
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SOURCE: Banco de España.
a Series in real terms, at the household level. Moving average of the current and three preceding quarters.
b The series for new consumer credit and other lending are adjusted to take into account the statistical break in June 2010, when the way in which credit card 
transactions are reported changed. From December 2014, the series are net of renegotiations.
c Series calculated by means of accumulation of the diffusion index (InD) created on the basis of the Bank Lending Survey (BLS). An increase in the series indicates 
greater restrictions (supply) and greater demand for credit (demand). The indicator at each moment in time is constructed as a weighted average of the responses of 
the banks. (a) Supply: 1 × (% of banks that have tightened their standards considerably) + 0.5 × (% of banks that have tightened them somewhat) – 0.5 × (% of banks 
that have eased their standards somewhat) – 1 × (% of banks that have eased their standards considerably). (b) Demand:1 × (% of banks reporting a considerable 
increase) + 0.5 × (% of banks reporting some increase) – 0.5 × (% of banks reporting some decrease) – 1 × (% of banks reporting a considerable decrease).
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2 THE EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT OF THE SPANISH ECONOMY
In 2018 Q2, global activity remained buoyant, since the recovery in growth among the 
advanced economies, especially in the United States, offset the slowdown recorded in 
certain emerging economies. The high-frequency indicators suggest that the rate of growth 
of activity will be sustained in Q3, and will moderate somewhat thereafter. In fact, the 
short-term risks to this path of sustained growth are tilted to the downside, given the 
uncertainty regarding global trade relations and the fact that the US macroeconomic policy 
mix may generate further financial strains in emerging markets.
The behaviour of the international financial markets was also mixed. While in the 
United States the tone was very positive, other developed markets performed less 
favourably and emerging economy markets suffered a significant deterioration. US 
stock markets reached all-time highs, driven by the favourable macroeconomic data 
and corporate earnings, and by the repatriation of capital by firms as a result of the tax 
reform. By contrast, euro area and UK markets saw moderate losses, due to trade 
tensions and the lack of agreement on Brexit. The gradual normalisation of monetary 
policy in the United States and the strong appreciation of the dollar against most 
currencies, especially those of emerging economies, have had a significant impact on 
the financial conditions of the economies with the greatest vulnerabilities. Despite the 
weakening of most of the emerging currencies (with the exception of the Mexican 
peso), stock market falls, the widening of sovereign debt spreads and capital outflows, 
this turbulence seems to be contained for the time being and in markets with better 
fundamentals the recent deterioration is being corrected (see Box 2). Finally, trade 
tensions arising from the protectionist measures taken by the United States particularly 
affected the markets in China, leading the authorities to take a number of steps to 
curb the depreciation of the renminbi and the potential slowdown in activity (see 
Box 3).
The commodities price index declined by 4.1% in the last quarter, owing to the widespread 
decrease in the price of its components, which was particularly pronounced in the case of 
industrial metals, against a backdrop of downside risks for international economic activity 
and, especially, for emerging economies. The price of Brent increased by 2.9% in the 
quarter and is trading at above $75. The sharp fall in Venezuela’s output, US sanctions on 
Iran and the lower-than-expected increase in Saudi Arabia’s output, following the June 
agreement between OPEC and its partners to increase supply, seem to have offset the 
factors depressing world demand.
In the United States GDP growth was very high in Q2 (rising from 2.2% to 4.2%, in 
annualised quarter-on-quarter terms) spurred by the recently approved tax package. 
In Japan, GDP quickened in Q2 (from 0.2% to 0.5% quarter-on-quarter) moving 
unexpectedly upwards, driven by private consumption, and in the United Kingdom 
GDP rose 0.2  pp to 0.4% quarter-on-quarter, underpinned by a slight recovery of 
consumption. Energy prices pushed inflation rates higher. In the United States, the 
year-on-year headline inflation rate reached 2.7% in August, and year-on-year core 
inflation stood at 2.2%. In Japan, consumer price growth remained stable (at 0.8% 
year-on-year in July, but below 1.4% at the beginning of the year), despite the record 
rise in nominal wages in June due to the payment of bonuses and overtime. In the 
United Kingdom, although inflation recovered slightly to 2.5% in July, it remains below 
2.1  The external 
environment of the 
euro area
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 28 ECONOMIC BULLETIN 3/2018 QUARTERLY REPORT ON THE SPANISH ECONOMY
the level of 3% seen early in the year. Against this background, the Federal Reserve 
strengthened its communication about the path of future rate rises, increasing the 
discrepancy with market expectations. In July, for the first time since September 
2016, the Bank of Japan changed its monetary policy framework, confirming its 
commitment to an ultra-loose monetary policy and introducing greater flexibility to its 
purchase programme. In August, the Bank of England raised the interest rate by 25 bp 
to 0.75%.
In the emerging economies, activity in 2018 Q2 generally performed less favourably. In Asia, 
GDP growth in China eased somewhat from 6.8% to 6.7% year-on-year, following a 
slowdown of investment resulting from policy tightening and the escalation of the trade war 
between the United States and China. In Latin America, activity data for 2018 Q2 showed 
considerable difficulties in the region, especially in Argentina. Finally, growth rates remained 
high in eastern Europe (except in the Czech Republic). As regards prices, the increase in 
inflationary pressures in Asian economies and eastern Europe stood out, while in Latin 
America inflation remained low (except in Argentina). Monetary policies experienced few 
changes, the main exception being those countries which were affected most by the recent 
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Economic activity in the euro area continued to expand in recent months, albeit at a 
notably lower pace than in 2017. The sustained appreciation of the euro against a broad 
set of currencies and the slowdown of world trade, in a setting of protectionist tensions, 
the deceleration in China and the materialisation of vulnerabilities in certain emerging 
markets, led to sluggish exports. Internal demand, by contrast, continued to expand, 
underpinned by favourable financial conditions, buoyant employment and lower 
deleveraging needs in the private sector. Nevertheless, in recent months, the confidence 
of consumers and business has deteriorated somewhat which could prompt their spending 
plans to be delayed or cancelled. Additionally, in Italy financial strains linked to uncertainty 
about the direction of the coalition government’s economic policy have resurfaced, which 
has given rise to a worsening of the growth outlook for this economy. 
Thus, on national accounts figures, euro area GDP grew by 0.4% in 2018 Q2, the same 
rate as in the preceding quarter (see Table 2), which was considerably lower than rates of 
close to 0.7% posted a year earlier. The year-on-year growth rate reached 2.1% in Q2, 
down from 2.4% in Q1. In terms of components, quarter-on-quarter output growth was 
underpinned by gross fixed capital formation, both private and public consumption, and 
the contribution of inventories (0.1  pp) which in certain countries reached high levels 
(0.4  pp in Germany). The contribution recorded by net external demand was negative 
(-0.2 pp), the same as in the previous quarter, since the growth of imports outstripped that 
of exports. In the main euro area countries growth was markedly stable. Thus, the growth 
2.2  The euro area and 
the monetary policy 
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rate rose by 0.1 pp in Germany to 0.5%, it slowed by the same amount in Italy and Spain 
to 0.2% and 0.6%, respectively, and it held at 0.2% in France. Employment in the euro 
area remained notably strong, increasing in Q2 by 0.4%, the same rate as in Q1.
The conjunctural information available for Q3 generally suggests that the moderate rate of 
increase – similar to that in the first half of the year – will continue (see Chart 5). The 
business confidence indicators based on the surveys of Purchasing Managers (PMI) 
declined in July and August for both the industrial and services sector, while those 
complied by the European Commission (EC) fell in industry and increased slightly in 
services and construction. Similarly, the latest data on consumer confidence and 
employment expectations worsened in that period. As regards external demand, the 
assessment of export orders declined in July and August, and export expectations 
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generally provide disappointing results for Q3. Specifically, retail sales decreased in July 
(0.2%) and, on the supply side, the industrial output index fell by 0.8% in July with respect 
to the previous month and the unemployment rate held at 8.2% for the third consecutive 
month. In contrast, vehicle registrations grew by 19.6% in August.
Further to the moderation of short-term growth, the deterioration of the situation of 
emerging economies, geopolitical tensions and uncertainty about protectionist policies 
are shaping a slightly less favourable scenario than was expected some months ago. 
Along these lines, in its September projection exercise, the ECB cut its GDP growth 
projections for 2018 and 2019 by 0.1 pp to 2% and 1.8%, respectively, and left the forecast 
for 2020 unchanged at 1.7% (see Table 3). The progressive waning of the monetary policy 
impulse along with, to a certain extent, the limitations on productive capacity arising from 
the expected decline in the working-age population justify this slowing profile (see Box 4). 
That said, the growth of euro area GDP is expected to continue to hold at above potential 
in the medium-term horizon.
Turning to prices, inflation was generally stable t in recent months. The headline index 
grew 2% year-on-year in August, down 0.1  pp on the previous month, owing to the 
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SOURCES: Eurostat, Markit Economics and Banco de España.
a Excluding Ireland, owing to the high volatility of its data.
b Year-on year rates, calculated on the basis of the non-centred quarterly moving average of the seasonally adjusted series.
c Normalised series for the period represented.
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e Year-on-year rates of the original monthly series. Quarterly average.
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deceleration of all of its components except for the prices of processed food whose growth 
rate remained unchanged. Core inflation, as measured by the CPI excluding unprocessed 
food and energy, also decreased by 0.1 pp to 1.2%, while other measures which remove 
the more volatile components held stable at rates of close to 1%. Conversely, negotiated 
wage rates rose notably compared to the restraint seen in previous years. In this setting, 
in the ECB’s projection exercise, expected inflation for 2018‑20 was maintained at 1.7% 
and core inflation was revised downwards by 0.1 pp in 2019 and in 2020 – to 1.5% and 
1.8%, respectively – in view of the diminished strength of economic growth.
In the fiscal realm, the general government deficit is expected to continue to narrow in 
2018 as a result of low interest rates and continued growth of activity. Fiscal policy’s 
contribution to growth is slightly expansionary owing to a reduction in taxes and social 
security contributions in certain economies. Noteworthy, by country, is the situation of Italy 
where the agreement to form a government included a set of expansionary measures 
(minimum wage scheme and income tax cuts). These measures could contravene 
commitments acquired under the Stability and Growth Pact and might not be finally 
implemented. The budgetary plans which countries must submit to the EC by 15 October 
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Also, in the area of European governance, the Euro Summit of end-June approved the 
creation of a common backstop for the Single Resolution Fund whose final design will be 
agreed in December. This backstop will be created on the basis of a new credit line from 
the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) to replace the direct recapitalisation instrument, 
thus conserving the fiscal neutrality of its actions. Negotiations on other essential items 
such as the cyclical stabilisation mechanism and the common deposit guarantee system 
were postponed. The Eurogroup committed to continue to work on these matters. The 
Ecofin meeting in September discussed proposals made by the EC, within the framework 
of the negotiation of the European budget for 2021-27, to reallocate resources to support 
structural reforms and to establish a mechanism that contributes to sustaining public 
investment in crisis situations.
In Q3, financial conditions in the euro area worsened, as a result of the appreciation of the 
nominal effective exchange rate of the euro against the currencies of emerging market 
economies, particularly the Turkish lira, and more recently against the dollar. The decline in 
stock prices for most of the quarter, which was more pronounced in banking institutions 
with higher exposure to Turkey and Argentina, and the increase in sovereign bond yields, 
also contributed to this deterioration (see Chart 7).
The upward trend in yields on securities traded on sovereign bond markets was widespread 
across countries, although it can be described as moderate in all cases except for Italy, where 
the start of the negotiations of the 2019 budgets in early August triggered another bout of 
tension, with strong upward pressures on the interest rates on government bonds and a decline 
in stock prices. At the beginning of September, the announcement by the Italian government 
that it would strengthen its commitment to comply with the requirements of the European fiscal 
framework led to a correction of yields, but there was still a great deal of uncertainty about the 
design of this economy’s fiscal policy. This time, there were few signs of contagion to other 
sovereign yields, with the exception of Greek debt, which was more vulnerable to episodes of 
instability following conclusion of the assistance programme in August.
In Germany, the ten-year bond yield stood at 0.47% towards the end of September and 
the spread over US government debt held steady at around 263 bp, slightly above the 
level recorded at end-June.
In the stock markets, the Eurostoxx 50 index increased by 1% over the quarter as a whole, 
with an overall decline of 2.1% since the beginning of the year, in contrast with the climbing 
stock markets in the United States. The stock prices in the banking sector moved on a 
downward path from end-July that only changed course in September, with an overall 
increase of 0.9% in the quarter.
On the currency market, the most notable aspect was the appreciation of the nominal 
effective exchange rate of the euro, by 2.6% in Q3, following the rise of only 0.3% in the 
previous quarter (see Chart  7.6). By currency, the euro appreciated against sterling by 
0.9% and the US dollar by 0.9%. There was a strong appreciation of the euro against 
emerging economies’ currencies (38.5% against the Turkish lira, 37.4% against the 
Argentine peso and the South African rand, and 4.3% against the Chinese yuan.
Lastly, the rate of expansion of lending to non-financial corporations and households was 
maintained in July, with the year-on-year rates of change standing at 4.1% and 3%, 
respectively (see Chart 8). The Bank Lending Survey in the euro area for 2018 Q2 suggests 
that loan growth continued to be sustained by increasing demand across all loan categories 
FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENTS AND 
MONETARY POLICY
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and slight moves to ease lending standards. As regards monetary aggregates, the year-on-year 
rate of M3 decreased by 0.5 pp in July to 4%. The year-on-year rate of the narrowest aggregate 
(M1) fell by 0.6 pp to 6.9%.
The slowdown in growth observed since the beginning of the year and the worsening of 
financial conditions underline the need to preserve the current monetary stimulus, in order 
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to ensure that inflation converges with the medium-term target, once the net asset 
purchases have concluded, as the ECB announced at its June meeting. Against this 
backdrop, at its September meeting, the ECB Governing Council reiterated that it expected 
to terminate net asset purchases in the framework of the APP at the end of the year, 
provided that the medium-term inflation outlook were maintained. In addition, the Council 
does not envisage changes in the short term to policy interest rates, which it expects to 
remain at their current levels1 at least until the summer of 2019. Specifically, as regards the 
APP, the pace of net asset purchases will be reduced in October from the current €30 billion 
a month to €15 billion until December 2018, and will conclude in January 2019. Moreover, 
the Council intends to continue reinvesting the principal payments from maturing securities 
as they arise in its APP portfolio over a prolonged period once the net asset purchases 
have concluded and, in any event, for as long as necessary. With the APP having been in 
place for more than three years, the value of the portfolio acquired until August amounted 
to slightly more than €2.5 trillion (around 23% of euro area GDP) and reinvestments from 











2015 2016 2017 2018
 BANK LOANS (a)  BONDS
%
2  NON-FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS
Year-on-year change











2015 2016 2017 2018





a Adjusted for securitisation and other transfers.
1  The interest rates on the main refinancing operations, the marginal lending facility and the deposit facility stood 
at 0%, 0.25% and -0.40% respectively.
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3 THE SPANISH ECONOMY
The quarter-on-quarter growth rate of the Spanish economy’s GDP stood at 0.6% in 2018 
Q2, 0.1 pp less than that recorded in the previous quarter (see Chart 9). The increase in 
output in the April-June period was exclusively attributable to the growth of domestic 
demand, whose positive contribution increased by 0.2 pp to 0.8 pp. Household spending 
(both on private consumption and residential investment) slowed down, while the remaining 
components of domestic demand accelerated (investment in capital goods and other 
products and in other construction, and government consumption). Conversely, the 
contribution of net external demand decreased to -0.2 pp, turning negative. Exports 
declined slightly more than imports, following increases in both in 2018 Q1. In year-on-
year terms, the GDP growth rate moderated by 0.3 pp to 2.7% and the employment rate 
fell back 0.1 pp to 2.5%.
The conjunctural information available suggests that the pace of GDP growth will hold at 
0.6% in Q3, as in the previous quarter. Domestic demand is estimated to continue to be 
the chief mainstay of output growth, whereas the contribution from external demand, on 
which there is still limited information, appears to remain slightly negative. Employment 
seems to have decelerated somewhat.
Since May, consumer prices have accelerated slightly because of the stronger growth of 
the energy component. Core inflation has moderated since then, as a result of the 
deceleration of the prices of services. Consequently, the year-on-year rate of change in the 
harmonised index of consumer prices (HICP) stood at 2.2% in August, 0.1 pp higher than 
in May, while core inflation (that which excludes energy and food) fell to 0.9 %, compared 
with 1.2% in May.
In the time lapsed since the beginning of 2018 Q3, the benchmark index for Spanish 
stock markets, the IBEX-35, fell by 0.3%, compared with an increase of 1% recorded 
for the same period by the EURO STOXX  50 of the euro area (see Chart 10.1). The 
performance of listed stock prices of Spanish firms with greater exposure to Argentina 
and Turkey was comparatively less favourable, particularly in the case of banks and, to 
a lesser degree, non-financial corporations. The risk premia on fixed-income securities 
issued by corporations have also risen, but in a subdued and isolated manner, standing 
below their end-June levels at the cut-off date for this report. The tensions in the Italian 
sovereign debt markets barely affected Spanish government debt. Thus, the Spanish 
ten-year bond yield has increased by close to 20 bp since the end of Q2, standing at 
1.5%, while its German counterpart rose by approximately 15 bp, slightly widening the 
spread between them to 106 bp. On the interbank market, 12-month EURIBOR hardly 
changed and stood at -0.17%. 
In recent months, financing conditions for households and non-financial corporations have 
remained very favourable, with the average cost of bank lending to the non-financial 
private sector holding at reduced levels, close to their all-time lows. This context has been 
conducive to the continued growth of new lending volumes, which has been stronger in 
the household financing segment, specifically in consumer loans. In terms of outstanding 
balances, these credit flow patterns have led to a slight easing of the rate of decline of 
loans to non-financial corporations, while the pace of growth of loans extended to 
households has been back in positive territory since June, for the first time since 2010. 
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This appears to have been basically the result of the lower repayment volumes in the 
segment of loans for house purchase. Finally, the financial position of households and 
non-financial corporations seems to have continued to strengthen in Q2, thus continuing 
the trend observed in recent years.
On the conjectural information available, the quarter-on-quarter rate of change in household 
consumer spending is estimated to have stood at 0.4% in Q3, a slightly higher rate of 
increase than that of the previous quarter, but notably lower than in the previous quarters 
(see Chart 11). The quantitative indicators published since the last Report offer mixed 
signals. The retail trade index quickened somewhat, as did the industrial production index 
(IPI) related with consumer goods. However, Social Security registrations performed less 
favourably that in previous quarters. The qualitative indicators, such as the services and 
consumer goods manufacturing PMIs or the retail trade confidence index, have tended to 
be less resilient than in Q2.
As regards residential investment, the latest economic data indicate that the rate of growth 
was higher in Q3 than in Q2. In particular, the coincident housing transaction indicators are 
especially buoyant. On INE data, prices of open-market housing accelerated in Q2, up to 
a year-on-year rate of growth of 6.8%, 0.6 pp above the Q1 figure. This higher increase in 
house prices occurred in the second-hand home segment, while the rate of growth of 
prices in the new-build segment was unchanged.
Households’ borrowing costs have remained relatively flat, at low levels, in recent months. 
Thus, between March and July (the latest data available), the average interest rate applied 
to new loans for house purchase fell by 0.1 pp to 2.1% (very close to the all-time low 
recorded in December 2017), while the average interest rate on consumer and other credit 
held steady around 6.3% (see Chart 10.2).
The results of the latest edition of the BLS (corresponding to July) indicate that the supply 
of credit to households remained favourable in Q2, since banks again eased their lending 
standards for both segments (house purchase, and consumption and other purposes). 
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Likewise, the general conditions applied to loans granted to households eased once more, 
especially margins on average loans, most notably in the consumption and other purposes 
segment. In turn, according to the BLS, the demand for consumer and other credit rose 
sharply, posting an increase not observed since 2015 Q2, while in the house purchase 
segment demand rose more moderately. The BLS also shows that as a result of these 
changes in lending standards, and the higher solvency of applicants, the percentage of 
rejected loan applications fell again in Q2. For Q3 the banks expected increases in 
households’ loan applications, as the supply of credit to households continued to ease.
This favourable combination of supply and demand factors translated into greater 
dynamism in the volume of new lending to households, with the highest rate of growth in 
the consumer credit and other purposes segment, driven in particular by the increase in 
new lending for durable goods consumption, whose rate of growth is outpacing that of 
consumer spending on durable goods (see Box 7). In terms of outstanding balances, the 
year-on-year rate of growth of households’ bank debt has been in positive territory since 
June (0.2% in July, compared with the drop of 0.3% recorded in March), for the first time 
SOURCES: Reuters, Datastream, MSCI, INE and Banco de España.
a The cost of equity is based on a three-stage Gordon dividend discount model.
b Includes off-balance-sheet securitisation and loans transferred to Sareb.
c Loans from resident credit institutions and specialised lending institutions.
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since 2010 (see Chart  10.3). The breakdown by purpose shows that this change is 
exclusively on account of the moderation in the rate of decline of lending for house 
purchase (0.7  pp since March, to 1.8% in July), offsetting the lower dynamism in the 
outstanding balance of consumer credit and other purposes loans (6.2% in July, compared 
with 6.6% four months earlier). It is estimated that the increase in the rate of growth of 
lending for house purchase is a result of the halt in the increase in the volume of repayments, 
interrupting the upward pattern of the last two years.
On the latest data available, the household debt ratio rose slightly in Q2, owing to the 
customary seasonal pattern of the debt balance in the second quarter, without this increase 
being offset by the growth in household income. In turn, the associated debt burden ratio was 
virtually unchanged in the period (see Chart 12.1). Households’ net wealth rose again between 
March and June, on the back of the appreciation in the real estate component and, to a lesser 
extent, in the financial component (asset growth outpaced that of liabilities, see Chart 12.2).
Business activity, proxied by the real value added of the market economy, appears to have 
grown at a slower pace in Q3 than in Q2, with a notable deceleration in industry and energy. 
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As regards business investment, the estimated increase in the capital goods component 
in Q3 is around 0.7% quarter-on-quarter, below the sharp increase recorded in Q2 (5.5%). 
The data available are still very limited, but the quantitative indicators, such as the capital 
goods IPI, point in this direction. For its part, investment in intangibles appears to have 
moderated compared with Q2. The good business investment momentum expected in the 
near and medium term would be consistent with a continuation of the upturn, in a setting 
in which capacity utilisation is at an all-time high.
The steady momentum in the cost of new bank lending to non-financial corporations 
has continued in recent months. Thus in July (the latest data available), the average 
interest rate applied to loans for less than €1  million was 2.6% (unchanged on four 
months earlier), while the average interest rate on loans for more than that figure was 
1.7% (barely 0.1  pp more than in March). In turn, between March and August, the 
estimated cost of equity fell by 50 bp to 9.5%, while the estimated cost of long-term 
corporate debt issues rose by 10 bp to 2.4% and that of short-term issues remained 
unchanged (see Chart 10.2).
According to the replies to July’s BLS, banks eased their credit standards for non-financial 
corporations in Q2, as overall terms and conditions also eased. The survey indicates that 
margins on average bank loans narrowed, while those on higher-risk exposures widened. 
Banks considered that demand remained stable. Looking ahead to Q3, they expected 
demand by non-financial corporations to rise sharply, with further easing in credit 
standards.
Against this backdrop of accommodative financing conditions, lending activity to 
corporations continued to grow in recent months, in comparison with previous quarters at 
a stronger pace in the case of new lending over €1 million and at a slower pace in the case 
of new lending under €1 million, the latter essentially reflecting lending to SMEs. In 
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granted by resident institutions to non-financial corporations moderated, to 1.2% in July, 
0.5  pp less than four months earlier (see Chart  10.4). In turn, financing obtained from 
issuance of debt securities (including issues by resident subsidiaries) continued to increase 
in year-on-year terms, posting a rate of growth of 5.5% in July, compared with 2.6% in 
March, an increase that to some extent reflects base effects. In the case of financing via 
loans from abroad, in recent months the rate of decline has intensified somewhat. Overall 
therefore, between March and July, the rate of contraction of total corporate sector debt 
moderated slightly, to 0.5% year-on-year in July.
The financial position of non-financial corporations is estimated to have continued to 
strengthen in Q2, carrying on the trend of recent years. Thus, the debt-to-GDP ratio, which 
is now below that of the euro area, for the first time since 2002, has fallen, as a consequence 
of the growth in GDP which fully offset the small increase in debt (see Chart  14). The 
interest burden appears to have evolved similarly to the debt ratio, although its decline 
was also furthered by a slight decrease in the average cost of debt. According to the 
sample of non-financial corporations contributing to the Central Balance Sheet Data Office 
Quarterly Survey (CBQ), which are mainly large corporations, the rate of growth of ordinary 
profits was 11% year-on-year in Q2, compared with 7.1% in the same period a year earlier, 
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revenue and costs.2 As a result, return on investment rose to 4.2% in Q2, 0.2 pp more than 
a year earlier.
The still very limited information available for Q3 suggests that net external demand could 
again make a negative contribution to quarter-on-quarter growth in GDP in Q3, amounting 
to around 0.1 pp. This, in a setting characterised by an increase in foreign trade in goods 
and services, both in exports and imports, compared with the respective declines of 1% 
and 0.3% in Q2.3 In year-on-year terms, the contribution of net external demand to GDP 
3.3  The external sector 
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SOURCES: INE and Banco de España.
a Interest-bearing borrowing.
b The last data point in each series is an estimate.
c The GDP data series is seasonally adjusted.
d Gross operating profit (GOP) plus financial revenue (FR).
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g Indicators calculated on the basis of annual CBSO data, or quarterly data where no annual data are available. A value of more (less) than 100 denotes higher 
(lower) financial pressure than in the base year.
2  See Analytical Article “Results of non-financial corporations in the first half of 2018” https://www.bde.es/f/
webbde/SES/Secciones/Publicaciones/InformesBoletinesRevistas/ArticulosAnaliticos/2018/T3/Files/
beaa1803-art23e.pdf in Economic Bullletin, 3/2018, Banco de España.
3  The slowdown in external demand, together with the loss of competitiveness (which seems to come into play with 
a certain time lag), are responsible for most of the deceleration in Spanish goods exports in 2018 to date. In 
addition, the main reason for the loss of momentum in tourism appears to be the gradual return to normal in the 
geopolitical situation of some of Spain’s main competitor destinations, such as Turkey and the countries of North 
Africa, see Box 6).
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would be negative and similar to its contribution in the last quarter (-0.2 pp), against the 
backdrop of a slowdown in world trade, growing protectionist tensions and sharp exchange 
rate depreciation in some emerging economies (see Chart 15).
The only Customs data available for the third quarter are those of July. According to them, 
real flows of exports and imports of goods increased substantially, recording year-on-
year growth rates of 6.3% and 4.9%, respectively. This does not necessarily mean that 
the phase of greater slackness observed during the first half of the year has been 
interrupted. Rather, this acceleration could basically be associated with calendar factors, 
making it unlikely for it to continue in the third quarter. The breakdown of exports by 
product shows that foreign sales of intermediate goods, particularly energy and capital 
goods, increased significantly. By geographical region, the main increase was in exports 
to EU markets. Non-EU exports grew much more moderately, probably, as in the case of 
the first half-year, owing to the effects of the loss of competitiveness arising from the 
exchange rate, built-up vis-à-vis these markets. On the side of purchases abroad of 
goods in real terms, imports of non-food consumer goods and non-energy intermediate 
products gained momentum.
Foreign tourist arrivals decreased by 4.9% in July compared to a year ago, when all-time 
highs were reached, accentuating the slowdown recorded since end-2017. This was in line 
with the gradual return to normal and recovery of our main competitor destinations in the 
Mediterranean region, against a background, in addition, of notable appreciation of the 
euro against these countries’ currencies (especially the Turkish lira). Other sporadic events, 
such as the unusual heat wave in continental Europe, the FIFA World Cup held in Russia 
or air transport strikes, could have influenced July tourism records somewhat negatively. 
There was a substantial decline in July in the number of tourists from Spain’s main source 
markets, such as the United Kingdom, Germany and France, although the buoyancy of 
other more distant markets continued, particularly that of tourists from the United States. 
Despite the increase in tourists’ daily average expenditure (9.5% year-on-year) and, to a 
lesser extent, in average spending per tourist (4.2% year-on-year), total spending 
decreased slightly in July (0.9% year-on-year), but grew 3% year-on-year during the seven 
first months of the year.
The Spanish economy’s net lending position decreased in the most recent period. 
Specifically, on cumulative 12-month data, the balance-of-payments surplus declined to 
1.7% of GDP (from 2.1% in 2017 as a whole). This resulted from the deterioration of the 
balance of goods and non-tourism services – in part owing to the escalation of oil prices 
– and, to a lesser degree, the increase in the primary and secondary income deficits, 
partially offset by an improvement in the tourism surplus and the increase in the positive 
balance of the capital account.
The most recent data available on cross-border financial flows show that the financial 
account of the balance of payments, excluding the Banco de España, had a credit balance 
of €20.5 billion in 2018 Q2. This performance was the result of an increase in holdings of 
foreign assets by resident agents (€31.4  billion), which exceeded the net increase in 
liabilities issued by them vis-à-vis the rest of the world (€9.9  billion), and the slightly 
negative net flow (around €900 million) of transactions associated with financial derivatives. 
On the assets side, the positive net flow was the outcome of investments under the 
heading of other investments (€17.1 billion), followed by direct investment (€8.5 billion), 
which related to equity, and portfolio investment (€5.8 billion), mainly debt securities. On 
the liabilities side, net investments in Spain by foreigners concentrated in direct investment 
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SOURCES: INE, Ministerio de Economía y Empresa and Banco de España.
a QNA data at constant prices. Seasonally adjusted series.
b Series deflated using export (IPRIX) and import (IPRIM) price indices for industrial products.
c 3-month moving average rates with three time lags, calculated on seasonally adjusted series. Dots depict quarter-on-quarter rate.
d Data conform to the sixth edition of the IMF's Balance of Payments and International Investment Position Manual (BPM6).
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(€21.2 billion), particularly in shares of non-financial corporations, since, unlike in recent 
quarters, they divested from portfolio investment (€1.9  billion) and, especially, other 
investment (€9.3 billion).
By institutional sector, net flows vis-à-vis the rest of the world were positive for other 
resident sectors (€13 billion) and for other monetary financial institutions (€12.5 billion), in 
line with their net lending position, while general government raised funds from abroad in 
net terms (€5 billion). The net balance of the financial account, excluding the Banco de 
España, exceeded the Spanish economy’s net lending position of €3 billion. Together with 
errors and omissions amounting to €3  billion, this resulted in a strong increase in the 
Banco de España’s net debtor position (€14.5 billion) vis-à-vis the rest of the world. This 
increase was also reflected in cumulative 12-month terms, since the Banco de España 
moved from a net credit balance (assets minus liabilities) in Q1 (of €8.2 billion) to a debit 
balance in June (of €12.2 billion), thus returning to the dynamics it had shown since the 
start of the Eurosystem’s asset purchase programme (see Chart 16.1).
The most recent information available on the international investment position (IIP) shows 
the Spanish economy’s net debt to the rest of the world to have decreased by €3.5 billion 
in the second quarter of 2018, to 82.6% of GDP, almost 1 pp less than three months earlier 
(see Chart 16.2). This reduction in the debit balance resulted from the positive amount of 
net financial transactions (€6 billion), which fully offset the negative amount of other flows 
(-€2.4 billion). The performance of the latter was driven by a decrease in the value of assets 
exceeding that of liabilities. In the case of assets, the fall resulted from price changes, 
especially in equity instruments, which were not offset by the effects of the depreciation of 
the euro. The net losses in the value of liabilities, which were mainly also due to changes 
in prices, materialised mostly in debt securities. Spain’s gross external debt decreased 
weakly, by 0.1 pp, in terms of GDP, to 168.2%, which is 6.4 pp less than the peak reached 
in 2018 Q1.
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a Four-quarter cumulative quarterly data.
b Sign changed.
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Employment accelerated in 2018 Q2, posting quarter-on-quarter growth of 0.8%, 0.3 pp 
higher than in Q1, in line with changes observed by the Spanish Labour Force Survey. 
However, the most recent labour market indicators point to a slight moderation of the 
dynamism of employment in the third quarter of the year. Social Security registrations in 
July and August posted lower month-on-month increases than those recorded in Q2. By 
sector, an acceleration was observed in construction, which maintains the highest growth 
rates together with non-market services, whose pace of growth remained stable. 
Conversely, Social Security registrations in agriculture, industry and market services 
slowed down. This information suggests that employment in Q3, measured in QNA terms,4 
could rise 0.5% in the total economy and 0.6% in the market economy, which would entail 
a decrease in the growth rate of 0.3 pp in both cases (see Charts 17.1 and 17.2).
The rate of decline of unemployment registered by the National Public Employment Service 
(SEPE by its Spanish abbreviation) continued on the moderate path seen since the 
beginning of the year, reaching 1.1% in August, in terms of the three-month seasonally 
3.4  The labour market
SOURCES: INE, Ministerio de Trabajo, Migraciones y Seguridad Social, Agencia Tributaria and Banco de España.
a Rates of change calculated on adjusted series. QNA employment measured in full-time equivalent job terms.
b Calculated on seasonally adjusted series at the Banco de España. Dots depict quarter-on-quarter rate.
c With data to August 2018. Excludes indexation clauses.











2015 2016 2017 2018
 SOCIAL SECURITY REGISTRATIONS
 REGISTERED UNEMPLOYMENT (right-hand scale)
2  EMPLOYMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT INDICATORS
Rate of change of 3-month moving average with three time lags (b)
%





2015 2016 2017 2018
 TOTAL ECONOMY (QNA)  MARKET ECONOMY (QNA)












2015 2016 2017 2018
 TOTAL ECONOMY
 MARKET ECONOMY







2015 2016 2017 2018
 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING WAGE INCREASE (c)
 AVERAGE REMUNERATION (TAX AUTHORITIES) (d)
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adjusted moving quarter-on-quarter rate (see Chart 17.2). The new contracts registered by 
the SEPE grew on average in the July-August period by more than in H1. The faster pace 
of hiring affected permanent contracts more than temporary ones, such that the share of 
permanent contracts in relation to a year ago rose by almost 2 pp, reaching 9.6% of the 
total.
As regards wages, the information on collective bargaining agreements registered until 
August shows a wage increase of 1.7%, 0.2 pp higher than agreed for 2017, with coverage 
for 7.5  million employees. The increase in wage rates was observed both in revised 
agreements (1.6%, compared with 1.3% in 2017) and in newly signed ones, the increase 
agreed being slightly higher in the latter case (2% for 2018). However, it is still early to 
detect the possible impact of the Agreement for Employment and Collective Bargaining 
that was signed in June by the social agents. By contrast, the information published by the 
tax collection agency on average gross pay at large non-financial corporations showed 
that it maintained its year-on-year rate of increase by 0.6% in July in terms of the 
seasonally-adjusted series. On QNA data for Q2, compensation per employee picked up 
somewhat, close to 0.4 pp, in both the total and the market economy, posting year-on-
year growth rates of 0.7% and 0.9%, respectively. This course of acceleration is expected 
SOURCES: INE, Eurostat and Banco de España.
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to continue in Q3, with a rise of 1.2% in the case of the market economy and somewhat 
stronger in the total economy (see Charts 17.3 and 17.4).
In 2018 Q3, it is estimated that the year-on-year growth of the imports deflator will have 
increased notably, against a background of higher oil prices, prolonging its upward trend. 
The year-on-year rate of increase of overall domestic producer prices, proxied by the GDP 
deflator, continued to be moderate in Q3, while that of the private consumption deflator is 
estimated to have increased slightly (see Chart 18.1).
The year-on-year rate of change of the HICP was 2.2% in August, 0.1 pp higher than in 
May.5 In turn, the inflation rate for the euro area as a whole increased in August by 0.1 pp 
relative to May, to 2% year-on-year. As a result, Spain’s inflation differential vis-à-vis the 
euro area is estimated to stand at 0.2 pp, the same as in May.
The acceleration of the overall HICP is the result of the trajectory of energy prices, whose 
year-on-year rate increased by 3.3  pp between May and August, affected by oil price 
developments and higher electricity prices. For its part, the year-on-year growth rate of 
food prices held at 2%. Core inflation, measured by the HICP excluding energy and food, 
eased by 0.3 pp to 0.9%, reflecting the deceleration of services prices by 0.6 pp, to 1.2%, 
while the rate of change of non-energy industrial goods prices remained stable, at 0.3%.
21.9.2018
3.5  Price developments
5  Likewise, the consumer price index (CPI) in August increased by 2.2% year-on-year, 0.1 pp above the rate of 
change in May, despite the slowing of the CPI excluding unprocessed food and energy by 0.3 pp relative to that 
month, to 0.8%.
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RESULTS OF NON-FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS IN THE FIRST HALF OF 2018
Álvaro Menéndez and Maristela Mulino
Published on 20 September 2018
According to data from the Central Balance Sheet Data Office Quarterly Survey, non-financial 
corporations continued to see an increase in activity, employment and ordinary profits in the first half 
of 2018, supporting a continued recovery in aggregate profitability levels. There was no significant 
change in debt ratios, while the debt burden continued to fall, reaching historic lows, indicating that 
financial pressure on the corporate sector is currently low. Nevertheless, the simulations included 
with this article reveal that certain segments of the corporate sector would be particularly vulnerable 
to rising borrowing costs
CREDITOR COUNTRIES AND DEBTOR COUNTRIES: SOME ASYMMETRIES IN THE 
DYNAMICS OF EXTERNAL WEALTH ACCUMULATION
Ángel Estrada and Francesca Viani
Published on 6 September 2018
Following the global financial crisis, the external imbalances in terms of countries’ current 
account balances have been reduced to a large extent. However, the imbalances measured in 
terms of net external wealth (or net international investment position, NIIP) have continued to 
increase. The empirical analysis presented in this article suggests that there is asymmetry 
between net debtor countries (negative NIIP) and net creditor countries (positive NIIP), with 
potential implications for global trade and growth. In the case of debtors, their negative NIIP 
contributes to reducing current account deficits and is therefore a stabilising factor. Conversely, 
in the case of the creditors, the NIIP contributes to increasing current account surpluses which, 
in turn, strengthens the dynamics of wealth accumulation in these countries, compared with the 
rest of the world.
MONETARY POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF CENTRAL BANK-ISSUED DIGITAL 
CURRENCY
Galo Nuño
Published on 30 July 2018
This article analyses the concept of digital currency issuable by a central bank, highlighting its 
similarities to and differences from the two main liabilities on its balance sheet: cash and bank 
reserves. It also discusses the main reasons why some central banks are looking into the 
potential consequences of the introduction of this new instrument. Lastly, it considers different 
central bank digital currency alternatives and highlights some of the possible implications for 
monetary policy conduct and for financial stability.
THE JULY 2018 BANK LENDING SURVEY IN SPAIN
Álvaro Menéndez Pujadas
Published on 24 July 2018
ANALYTICAL ARTICLES
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The results of the Bank Lending Survey show that during 2018 Q2 credit standards for new loans 
eased slightly in all segments, both in Spain and in the euro area. Household demand for credit 
grew in both areas, while that from enterprises did so only in the euro area, holding stable in 
Spain. As regards funding, both Spanish and euro area banks generally perceived some 
improvement in access conditions to retail markets and a slight deterioration in practically all 
wholesale markets. During the first half of 2018, regulatory and supervisory measures are 
estimated to have been conducive, in both areas, to some increase in capital levels, and, in the 
case of the euro area, also in assets. According to Spanish banks, these measures are not 
expected to have appreciably impacted either their funding conditions or lending standards or 
margins on loans. In the case of the euro area, they provided for some easing in institutions’ 
funding conditions, along with a slight tightening in credit standards, not significantly affecting 
the margins applied in most segments. Banks in both areas highlighted, as the key factors for the 
setting of their margins, the search for yield and competitive pressures. Finally, the NPL ratio has 
not significantly affected Spanish institutions’ lending policies during the first half of 2018, while 
it has contributed to some tightening in the euro area.
INVESTMENT AND FINANCING OF SPANISH NON-FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS: AN 
ANALYSIS USING FIRM-LEVEL DATA
Daniel Dejuán, Álvaro Menéndez and Maristela Mulino
Published on 12 July 2018
According to the analysis conducted in this article, based on individual firms’ balance sheet 
information, Spanish corporate investment tended to pick up from 2014 and to do so with greater 
intensity at SMEs than at large corporations, after having contracted more forcefully during the 
early stages of the crisis at SMEs. In any event, as regards the stock of productive assets 
(tangibles and intangibles alike), the investment level attained in 2016 is expected to still be 
below pre-crisis figures. Analysis of investment determinants highlights the fact that the strength 
of the financial position and of profitability are positively related to business investment decisions, 
especially during the post-crisis period. As to the sources of financing used, firms with net 
positive investment resorted, throughout the period, both to own and borrowed funds, although 
the relative weight of the latter fell significantly from 2008. Firms investing intensively in intangibles 
– which were financed, until 2007, both with own and borrowed funds – began, with the onset of 
the crisis, to depend practically exclusively on own funds. That suggests the possible existence 
of greater difficulties for firms with a high concentration of intangible assets in gaining access to 
borrowed funds.
RECOURSE TO EUROSYSTEM FUNDING BY SPANISH BANKS
Ricardo Gimeno and Ana del Río
Published on 5 July 2018
During the crisis, euro area banks’ recourse to Eurosystem funding facilities was closely related 
to the severe tensions in the funding markets. However, since the latter part of 2014, Eurosystem 
refinancing operations have been essentially determined by the implementation of the single 
monetary policy and the need to reinforce the monetary stimulus by means of non-standard 
measures. The Spanish banking system currently has a relatively high level of recourse to 
Eurosystem funding, as a proportion of GDP and in terms of its weight in the banking sector 
balance sheet, although its share of total Eurosystem funding has fallen since 2014. The long 
maturities of this funding and the favourable conditions in the financial markets in the more 
recent period have afforded banks more scope to refinance or repay these debts in an orderly 
manner.
TRADE PATTERNS OF CHINA AND INDIA
Elena Vidal
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Published on 29 June 2018
China and India are playing an increasingly significant role in global trade. In 2016, their joint 
share of the global trade in goods reached around 14%, while their share of services came to 
7.5%. They have very different trade profiles, however, also reflecting very different 
internationalisation strategies. Since opening up in the 1980s, China has taken on a global 
trade hub role, thanks to its growing integration into global production chains for manufactured 
goods. More recently, China has undergone a shift in trade specialisation towards a pattern 
characterised by the export of products with higher domestic value added (i.e. it has moved up 
the global value chain). India’s integration into global value chains has been much more limited 
and, since the early stages of its economic liberalisation, services have accounted for a 
substantial share of its exports. Although India’s export profile has remained fairly stable in 
recent decades, a growing weight of manufacturing exports with a greater import content has 
recently become discernible. Against this background, the estimation of goods export demand 
equations shows how, in the long run, external demand is the factor that wields most influence 
on developments in both countries’ exports, albeit more powerfully so in China, while price-
competitiveness has a greater influence on Indian exports.
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REFERENCE VARIABLES FOR ANALYSING INFLATION IN SPAIN
Luis Julián Álvarez and Isabel Sánchez
Published on 14 September 2018
ECONOMIC NOTES
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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
COUNTRIES AND CURRENCIES
In accordance with Community practice, the EU countries are listed using 
the alphabetical order of the country names in the national languages.
BE Belgium EUR (euro)
BG Bulgaria BGN (Bulgarian lev)
CZ Czech Republic CZK (Czech koruna)
DK Denmark DKK (Danish krone)
DE Germany EUR (euro)
EE Estonia EUR (euro)
IE Ireland EUR (euro)
GR Greece EUR (euro)
ES Spain EUR (euro)
FR France EUR (euro)
IT Italy EUR (euro)
HR Croatia HRK (Croatian kuna)
CY Cyprus EUR (euro)
LV Latvia EUR (euro)
LT Lithuania EUR (euro)
LU Luxembourg EUR (euro)
HU Hungary HUF (Hungarian forint)
MT Malta EUR (euro)
NL Netherlands EUR (euro)
AT Austria EUR (euro)
PL Poland PLN (Polish zloty)
PT Portugal EUR (euro)
RO Romania RON (New Romanian leu)
SI Slovenia EUR (euro)
SK Slovakia EUR (euro)
FI Finland EUR (euro)
SE Sweden SEK (Swedish krona)
UK United Kingdom GBP (Pound sterling)
JP Japan JPY (Japanese yen)
US United States USD (US dollar)
ABS Asset-backed securities
APP Asset Purchase Programme
BCBS Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
BE Banco de España
BIS Bank for International Settlements
BLS Bank Lending Survey
BOE Official State Gazette
CBA Central Balance Sheet Data Office Annual Survey
CBQ Central Balance Sheet Data Office Quarterly Survey
CBSO Central Balance Sheet Data Office
CCR Central Credit Register
CDSs Credit default swaps
CESR Committee of European Securities Regulators
CNE Spanish National Accounts
CNMV National Securities Market Commission
CPI Consumer Price Index
CSPP Corporate sector purchase programme
DGF Deposit Guarantee Fund
EBA European Banking Authority
ECB European Central Bank
ECOFIN Council of the European Communities (Economic and 
Financial Affairs)
EDP Excessive Deficit Procedure
EFF Spanish Survey of Household Finances
EFSF European Financial Stability Facility
EMU Economic and Monetary Union
EONIA Euro overnight index average
EPA Official Spanish Labour Force Survey
ESA 2010 European System of National and Regional Accounts
ESCB European System of Central Banks
ESFS European System of Financial Supervisors
ESM European Stability Mechanism
ESRB European Systemic Risk Board
EU European Union
EURIBOR Euro interbank offered rate
EUROSTAT Statistical Office of the European Communities
FASE Financial Accounts of the Spanish Economy
FDI Foreign direct investment
FROB Fund for the Orderly Restructuring of the Banking Sector
FSB Financial Stability Board
FSF Financial Stability Forum
GDI Gross disposable income
GDP Gross domestic product
GFCF Gross fixed capital formation
GNP Gross national product
GOP Gross operating profit
GVA Gross value added
HICP Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices
IASB International Accounting Standards Board 
ICO Official Credit Institute
IFRSs International Financial Reporting Standards
IGAE National Audit Office
IIP International Investment Position
IMF International Monetary Fund
INE National Statistics Institute
LTROs Longer-term refinancing operations
MFIs Monetary financial institutions
MROs Main refinancing operations
MTBDE Banco de España quarterly macroeconomic model
NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement
NAIRU Non-accelerating-inflation rate of unemployment
NCBs National central banks
NFCs Non-financial corporations
NiGEM National Institute Global Econometric Model
NPISHs Non-profit institutions serving households
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
ONP Ordinary net profit
OPEC Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries
PER Price/earnings ratio
PMI Purchasing Managers’ Index
PPP Purchasing power parity
QNA Quarterly National Accounts
SAFE ECB Survey on the Access to Finance of Enterprises
SDRs Special Drawing Rights
SEPA Single Euro Payments Area
SGP Stability and Growth Pact
SMEs Small and medium-sized enterprises
SRM Single Resolution Mechanism
SSM Single Supervisory Mechanism
TFP Total factor productivity
TLTROs Targeted longer-tem refinancing operations
ULCs Unit labour costs
VAT Value Added Tax
WTO World Trade Organization
CONVENTIONS USED
M1 Notes and coins held by the public + sight deposits.
M2 M1 + deposits redeemable at notice of up to three months + 
deposits with an agreed maturity of up to two years.
M3 M2 + repos + shares in money market funds and money 
market instruments + debt securities issued with an agreed 
maturity of up to two years.
Q1, Q4 Calendar quarters.






— Nil, non-existence of the event considered or insignificance 
of changes when expressed as rates of growth.
0.0 Less than half the final digit shown in the series.
